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Abstract 
 
The current ascendancy of right-wing populists across western democracies is a concerning trend, 
and so far, the left has not managed to mount an effective counterstrategy to arrest its momentum. 
Much of the rhetoric of these right-wing populists has focused on evoking fear and suspicion, 
verging on hatred, of outsiders and fellow countrymen and women with opposing political 
ideologies, to great effect. The importance of understanding why certain rhetoric is effective cannot 
be understated, and the works of George Lakoff, Jonathan Haidt, and Drew Westen that illuminate 
the moral and emotional factors behind how individuals interpret and respond to inputs of a political 
nature are reviewed and synthesised. Individuals’ underlying moral mental structures and the 
emotional responses that they can trigger must be understood in order to generate political 
messaging that resonates strongly with its target audience and consequently increases the likelihood 
of their actuation to vote. The recent phenomenon of individualisation, stemming from the current 
era of reflexive modernity is analysed within the context of divergent conservative and liberal moral 
matrices, and is found to be disproportionately ailing the liberal side of politics. In delineating the 
key elements of liberal and conservative morality, the existence of liberal moral tenets that are 
discordant with longstanding liberal communitarian ideals were revealed. In contrast, conservative 
morality appears to exhibit an inherent coherence that may contribute to conservatism’s resilience 
in the face of reflexive modernity and disparate policy priorities of its constituents. The importance 
of understanding the moral and emotional foundations of political cognition is emphasised not only 
for its potential to bolster the efficacy of left-wing political parties, but also to provide an avenue 
by which the increasing hostility across the political spectrum can be subdued.  
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1. Introduction 
 
“Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can 
never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them” 
—David Hume, Treatise on Human Nature  
A trend is currently evident across much of Europe and in the USA, whereby left-wing parties are 
ceding ground to a brand of right-wing populism that now exhibits a widespread and growing level 
of support (Inglehart & Norris 2016, Tartar 2017). The twin 2016 shocks of Brexit and Donald 
Trump’s election can be seen as the very concrete political realisation of the potential this trend has 
for profound and long-term societal change. The UK will be dealing with the after-effects of Brexit 
for a generation and many of the democratic and political norms in the USA have been decimated, 
while the confirmation of two conservative supreme court judges will shape the judicial landscape 
for decades. Mudde (2004) defines populism as: 
“…an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two 
homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, 
and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale 
(general will) of the people” 
The success of the right-wing brand of populism — evidenced in recent political happenings across 
Europe and the USA — has been largely attributed to harnessing both economic and cultural 
anxieties in an increasingly interconnected world (Arzheimer, 2009; Gidron & Hall, 2017; Mols & 
Jetten, 2016; Rodrik, 2017), but what is often left unexamined is the role that is played by the 
mental processes that lead people to these anxieties in the first place.  
Fear has long been known as a potent emotion, susceptible to manipulation for political gain, and 
as the pace of change in today’s modern world increases, there are many things that can evoke it. 
However, many such fears are stoked by political rhetoric that is neither based in reality nor 
withstands the rigours of reasoned argumentation. This expression of irrational fear is not, however, 
the only emotional response manifested in this way without a sound basis in reality. It is in the 
interests of politicians to evoke as many emotions that further their political goals as possible, and 
the methods utilised by the current crop of right-wing populists for doing-so and the reason for 
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their efficacy need to be understood, lest the current-day political domain in western democracies 
remain a lopsided battlefield, continually exploited to great effect by one side of the political 
spectrum, while the other languishes in opposition. This is an urgent undertaking, as the politics of 
fear and division have resulted in some of the darkest chapters in modern human history and this 
current trend must therefore be arrested. 
To understand why these emotionally evocative strategies are so effective, a study of the source of 
such emotional responses must be undertaken. Morality is proposed as deeply interrelated with 
emotion, and an area of study that must be included in any such endeavour. This thesis reviews the 
work of three authors (George Lakoff, Jonathan Haidt, & Drew Westen) that draw on different 
theoretical foundations and utilise different methodological approaches to explore how emotion 
and morality are related to not only the manifestation of political views, but what the underlying 
mental mechanisms and processes are that contribute to their manifestation. This manifestation of 
political views and their underlying causative mental mechanisms and processes will hereafter be 
referred to as ‘political sense-making’. The work of these three authors has been used to create a 
synthesis, bringing various elements together to delineate the varied facets of this political sense-
making process. This forms the foundation from which suggestions of priority areas of focus for 
left-wing political parties and areas of future research are derived. As all three of these authors are 
from the USA, the specific delineation of the moral architecture of individuals and how it relates 
to political sense-making is likely to be specific to the USA. However, the fundamental claim of 
this thesis regarding the role of morality and emotion in the political sense-making process is 
expected not to be country-specific, but rather a universal tendency of the human mind. 
In addition, the process of individualisation of modern western societies is discussed and its impact 
on the underlying moral architecture of individuals in a society is analysed. Findings from the 
review of key literature and domains of moral convergence identified within the synthesis are then 
interpreted through the lens of a potentially lopsided influence of this individualisation process on 
one side of the political spectrum relative to the other. Finally, a construct is derived from the 
synthesis that insinuates there may be fundamentally discordant elements of left-wing ideology 
which are contributing to the flagging fortunes of left-wing parties across modern western societies, 
and that the individualisation process may be exacerbating this phenomenon. 
An underlying philosophy of interdisciplinarity informs this thesis, which is a core reason behind 
the epistemological focus on triangulation and the methodology of theory synthesis chosen to 
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explore this topic. Siloed bodies of specialised knowledge are not capable of adequately dealing 
with the inherent complexity of many social phenomena, as their boundaries often flow across 
multiple academic fields. The political sense-making process is one such phenomenon and as such, 
it demands a broad approach to adequately describe its multi-faceted nature. The three authors 
chosen as the primary focus of the literature review for this thesis are from the fields of cognitive 
linguistics, moral psychology and clinical psychology and are able to coalesce a broad range of 
theoretical and empirical findings into their own syntheses which have subsequently been utilised 
to illuminate the findings of this thesis. This recognition of complexity and consequent rejection of 
reductionist forms of analysis relating to social phenomena, embodies both the theory of Cultural 
Political Economy and the meta-theory of Critical Realism that underpin this thesis.  
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2. Theory 
 
2.1. Cultural Political Economy 
Engaging in study of the social world inevitably involves some manner of complexity reduction, 
as the world is too complex to be grasped in all its complexity in real time (Sum & Jessop, 2008) 
and, unlike the realm of natural sciences, reductionist forms of enquiry cannot isolate individual 
self-evident components in their entirety, as social relations and phenomena are invariably 
interrelated with others. One way to successfully study the social world is with the use of the 
processes of semiosis and structuration, which can flesh out social imaginaries, and emphasise 
structure-agent relationships that may not be self-evident. Sum & Jessop (2013) define semiosis as 
‘…the most general term for sense- and meaning making’ (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p.152) and as 
often involving ‘…conversation, negotiation, contestation and, indeed open conflict about the sense 
and meaning of communications’ (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p.152), whereas structuration is defined 
as ‘limiting compossible social relations’ (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p.3) or more specifically ‘…a form 
of enforced selection that sets limits to compossible combinations of relations among relations 
within specific time-space envelopes’ (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p.4). These analytical processes 
underpin the theory of the Cultural Political Economy (CPE) which stresses the importance of the 
cultural dimension (semiosis or meaning-making) in dealing with the inherent complexities of 
social formations.  
This research paradigm evolved in reaction to the cultural turn, a movement beginning in the 1970s 
which argues for a shift away from positivist epistemological attempts to comprehend the social 
world and towards a focus on meaning and complexity and the role of culture in contemporary 
debates. Ontologically, CPE insists that the process of semiosis itself contributes to the construction 
and composition of social phenomena and epistemologically, critiques the inadequacy of orthodox 
political economy categories and methods in capturing historic and contextual elements of reality 
(Jessop, 2004). CPE seeks to ground the cultural turn in political economy in the necessity of 
complexity reduction as the fundamental impetus of research in this field (Jessop, 2010), while 
combining the cultural turn with institutional and evolutionary political economy perspectives 
(Jessop, 2004). The concept of the ‘imaginary’ is used to describe ‘semiotic systems that shape 
lived experience in a complex world’ (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p.26), and will be particularly relevant 
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for this thesis, as both the central metaphors of Lakoff and Haidt’s Moral Foundation Theory are 
argued as being such imaginaries. 
CPE is primarily used to critique reductionist approaches to economic analysis and offer an 
alternative synthesis of a political economy  that adequately accounts for cultural, social and 
historical factors that constitute the complex reality in which the political economy is embedded. 
This ontological insistence on the inherent complexity of reality and the epistemological rejection 
of such reductionist approaches to the social world make CPE an ideal research paradigm to apply 
elsewhere in the social sciences (Sum & Jessop, 2013). Specifically, CPE’s focus on semiosis and 
structuration constitutes a methodology that is useful to focus anywhere that complex social 
relations and practices beg to be understood.  
The claim that semiosis has a constitutive effect on social phenomena has particular relevance for 
the field of political science. A sub-section of the field is engaged in attempts to create political 
success out of understanding what factors motivate individual voting tendencies and where there 
are opportunities to exploit subconscious biases or vulnerabilities, and as both phenomena are borne 
out of complex interactions between the human mind and social formations, this assertion of a 
constitutive influence suggests that the very study of these interactions and their connection to real-
world political outcomes has the potential to, in itself, affect such outcomes. This implication 
provides impetus for the study of these interactions to advance specific political agendas, and as a 
core motivating factor for this thesis is responding to the efficacy of current-day right-wing 
populism, it lends justification for the topic of this thesis. 
Understanding the inherent complexity of how a human mind politically ideates and responds to 
politically oriented inputs requires an approach that accommodates such complexity, rather than 
attempting to deny or neglect it. Semiosis and structuration provide such an analytical approach; 
emphasising the need to appreciate complexity, while reducing it into describable elements. These 
analytical principles will be applied in this research project, as it is assumed there are real structures 
and mechanisms that contribute to the political orientation of individuals, and while some may be 
empirically verifiable, others may lay beneath the realm of directly observable phenomena. In 
considering this, the semiotic analysis undertaken in this thesis will seek to engage with the real 
that may lie beyond the realm of the empirical, as well as utilising the empirically observable in an 
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attempt to adequately describe reality. This approach embodies the  philosophical perspective of 
critical realism. 
 
2.2. Critical Realism 
 
To understand reality through the lens of an empiricist worldview is to reduce reality merely to the 
observable (Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen, & Karlsson, 2002). While this satisfies a scientific 
approach that seeks to simply document the phenomena experienced by humans, it falls short of 
unveiling the mechanisms that may have interacted with each other to manifest these phenomena. 
In the natural sciences, many of the mechanisms that interact in this way have been previously 
described without direct observation by discovering and interpreting the laws of physics, and many 
have subsequently been observed once our technology had advanced to a point where it became 
possible to do-so. The realm of social science does not have the luxury of unbreakable natural laws, 
and as such, it is problematic to rely solely on a positivist approach to understand mechanisms that 
operate on this level. While positivist approaches can still yield valuable insights relating to the 
social world, they cannot provide insights into such mechanisms that operate below the realm of 
the observable. Critical realism attempts to articulate this point, by emphasising the need for a clear 
ontology. A critical realist ontology states that while the objects of natural science are socially 
defined, but naturally produced, and the objects of social science are socially defined and produced, 
the socially produced objects are no less real (Sayer, 1992).  
A central feature of critical realism is its critique of the ‘epistemic fallacy’ in which questions about 
the existence of a phenomena or its ontology, are answered by relating what we know about it. Put 
another way, the ontological domain of existence is reduced to the epistemological domain of 
knowledge or what we can know or experience (Mingers, 2006). Neoclassical economists are 
accused of falling prey to this by reducing the economy to atomised consumers and firms that can 
be analysed using a formalistic methodology, but they are not alone in committing this fallacy, as 
many in the social sciences reject anything other than a positivist approach. To move past this and 
acknowledge complexity and underlying mechanisms and fundamental structures opens another 
paradigm for social science research, where conceptualisation and mixed methodology approaches 
are afforded greater prominence. Abductive and retroductive reasoning are fundamental to a critical 
realist approach and can also play a pivotal role in this new research paradigm; recontextualising a 
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given phenomenon giving it a new meaning, and imagining what reality must be like for a given 
concrete phenomena to come about respectively (Danermark et al., 2002). Both abduction and 
retroduction are creative processes, as relations and connections that have not been identified yet 
between one phenomenon and others requires the forming of these connections through creative 
reasoning. While these types of reasoning stand in contrast to the formal logic of induction and 
deduction, they can be combined with induction in order to increase the reliability or validity of 
associations made as new cases occur and can be continuously related to these associations.  
Retroduction has at its core transcendental argumentation, where the basic prerequisites for social 
phenomena, reasoning and knowledge are sought. As this type of argumentation goes beyond 
merely the realm of the observable, it is also known as transfactual argumentation (Danermark et 
al., 2002). Examples of such reasoning are Zygmunt Bauman’s (1989) explanations of the 
Holocaust by asking the question: what made the Holocaust possible? And Randal Collins’ (1990) 
probing of the nature of rituals and their role in society by posing the question: What is the ultimate 
precondition for social solidarity and for society to exist? By posing questions that seek to explain 
not just the occurrence of a phenomenon, but the factors that allowed it to come to be, an opening 
is created to explore the deep structures and mechanisms of the social world and in doing so, evokes 
the use of creative thinking to produce a new synthesis. This transfactual argumentation is behind 
the conceptual metaphors and categories that Lakoff uses to answer his own transfactual questions: 
what unifies the collections of progressive and conservative political positions? (Lakoff, 1996) The 
theoretical background that supports the use of conceptual metaphors as an explanatory tool is 
explored below. 
2.3. Moral Reasoning as Metaphorical Reasoning 
Much of everyday language is of a metaphorical nature, whether it be during an informal 
conversation between friends, or a work-related discussion (Gibbs, Jr, 1994). There are three 
generally accepted reasons why people tend to speak in such metaphorical forms (Fainsilber & 
Ortony, 1987; Gibbs, Jr, 1994; Ortony, 1975). Firstly, the inexpressibility hypothesis, which states 
that metaphors provide a way of expressing ideas that would be extremely difficult to convey with 
literal language. Secondly, the compactness hypothesis, which proposes that the use of metaphor 
can more effectively convey complex configurations of information in relatively few words 
compared to the use of literal language alone, and thirdly and relatedly, the vividness hypothesis, 
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which asserts that due to metaphor’s ability to convey complex configurations of information, 
richer, more detailed and vivid accounts of our subjective experience are possible with their use, 
compared to literal language. These hypotheses provide a compelling account as to why metaphors 
are used frequently in language, but is metaphor perhaps used at a higher level of cognition to relate 
more complex and interrelated concepts and moral systems?  
By utilising linguistic evidence, Lakoff & Johnson (1983) argue for a Contemporary Theory of 
Metaphor, wherein much of the human conceptual system is claimed to be metaphorical in nature. 
They give the example of the concept of an argument being translated into the metaphor of 
‘argument is war’; where arguments are won or lost, claims defensible or indefensible, weak points 
can be attacked or shot down and criticisms can be either on- or off-target. Another example given 
is that of money as a metaphor for time; where time can be spent, given, invested, saved, budgeted, 
or put aside. The essence of metaphor is understanding one type of phenomenon in terms of another, 
and Lakoff & Johnson argue that this is a fundamental part of how humans conceptualise and make 
sense of the world. The fact that its role in such conceptualisation has largely gone unanalysed until 
recent decades (Fainsilber & Ortony, 1987) may be a symptom of the fact that we are rarely aware 
of our conceptual system. However, looking more closely at language and how it conveys various 
concepts can illuminate the role that metaphor plays in this system.  
George Lakoff asserts that much of moral reasoning is metaphorical reasoning and provides 
examples of such in his book Moral Politics (1996). He cites an op-ed in the Houston Chronicle 
(section A, p. 30, February 4, 1995) that describes a large budget shortfall ($722M) in the city of 
Washington D.C. being caused, metaphorically, by “a poor mother with a credit card” who believes 
“If it’s good for the kid to have, then I ought to buy it—and worry later where the money will come 
from” and who has “…reached her credit limit” and should “…learn to say no—not just to junk 
food, but to quality cuts of meat she can’t afford” (Lakoff, 1996, p. 6). This is an elaborate 
conceptual metaphor, one in which it is assumed the readers will not only understand but see as 
common sense. However, to see this as common sense, requires a particular moral interpretation 
of this metaphor, as one must agree that the cited budget shortfall is indeed due to ‘irresponsible’ 
spending and paying for things that are ‘unaffordable’. The image of an ill-disciplined mother who 
is indulging her children irresponsibly with money she doesn’t have implies she must learn 
discipline and self-denial in order to be a good mother. Another moral interpretation of this situation 
is that essential services for the citizens of D.C. are not being underwritten by sufficient government 
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revenue and that the government has a responsibility to find alternative sources of revenue to 
maintain these services. This is a clear demonstration of the role that metaphor can play in reasoning 
about issues of a moral, political nature, and how this can be utilised to reinforce political narratives 
of a certain ideology, as the overspending, ill-disciplined motif is typically representative of 
conservative ideology. If it is accepted that much of this kind of moral reasoning is indeed 
metaphorical in nature, then the question that arises is to what extent is political ideology 
constituted through conceptual metaphors. This question is comprehensively explored by Lakoff 
in Moral Politics (1996) and is addressed further in chapter four. 
2.4. Moral Foundation Theory 
Jonathan Haidt, with the use of insights from social psychology and sociology, has developed an 
alternative explanation for how morality is intertwined with political ideology, stemming primarily 
from his Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt, 2012). Conceptual metaphor is not afforded a key role 
in explaining the process of moral reasoning, although similarly to Lakoff, moral reasoning, for the 
most part, is asserted as mostly intuitive, not deliberative (Graham et al., 2012). Haidt, however, 
seeks to combine previous insights on the origin of human morality and build on them to explain 
the process of an individual’s moral evolution from birth to adulthood. A broad exploration of 
Moral Foundations Theory and its implications for political sensemaking will be undertaken in 
chapter four, but here, a brief exploration of the origins and theoretical underpinnings of this theory 
will be attempted.  
2.4.1. Origins 
In the late 20th century, there was a debate between social scientists studying the origins of morality 
as to whether morality is derived or constrained by innate mental systems and if so, how many 
mental systems (de Waal, 1996; Joyce, 2006; Wright, 1994). Kohlberg (1969) asserted that the 
answer is one; that a progression to higher stages of moral development could be explained by a 
continual reference to the promotion of justice. Gilligan (1983) argued that there is an ethic of care 
women and girls develop that cannot be derived from that of justice, and in doing so, asserted that 
there is at least two mental systems at play. This care/justice formulation has been widely accepted 
in recent decades and has been shown to primarily be the basis of morality for those in WEIRD 
(Western, educated, industrialised, rich, and democratic) cultures (Haidt, 2012). Shweder, 
Mahapatra and Miller (1987) have shown through their research, however, that the moral domain 
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is broader in India than it is in WEIRD cultures. This finding has not only been backed up by 
looking at other countries such as Brazil (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993) and Japan (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991) and comparing them to WEIRD cultures, but by looking within lower 
socioeconomic groups in countries with WEIRD subgroups (Haidt et al., 1993). Whereas WEIRD 
cultures tend to see a world full of separate objects rather than relationships, and think analytically 
(detaching the focal object from its context, assigning it to a category and then assuming that what’s 
true about the category is true about the object) (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001), those 
from other cultures tend to focus more on relationships, contexts, groups and institutions and to 
think more analytically (seeing the whole context and the relationships among parts) (Haidt, 2012). 
With this distinction in perception and thinking between cultures, argues Haidt, comes a distinction 
in the kind of moral framework and the virtues and concerns incorporated within it, required to 
bind such people together. 
Based on the research Shweder conducted in India, he formulated a new theory of morality based 
on three ethics: autonomy, community, and divinity (Shweder et al., 1987). These ethics were 
isolated through analysing the hundreds of interviews conducted and each one is based on a 
different idea of what a person really is. The ethic of autonomy is dominant in individualistic 
societies and is strongly related to WEIRD cultures, as it is based on the notion that people are, first 
and foremost, autonomous individuals with wants, needs, and preferences (Haidt, 2012). 
Conversely, the ethic of community is based on the idea that people are, first and foremost, 
members of larger entities such as families, teams, armies, companies, tribes, and nations, that these 
entities are important, and that their gestalt is greater than the sum of the people who compose 
them. Moral concepts such as duty, hierarchy, respect, reputation and patriotism align seamlessly 
with this ethic. The third ethic of divinity is based on the notion that people are primarily temporary 
vessels within which a divine soul has been implanted and that they should behave as if they were 
a child of god. This notion then leads to the formulation of moral concepts such as sanctity, purity, 
and elevation (Haidt, 2012).  
Alan Fiske (1991) wrote about four elementary forms of human relations: communal sharing, 
authority ranking, equality matching and market pricing, upon which moral judgement relies. 
Despite many overlapping threads between Shweder’s three ethics and Fiske’s four relational 
models, it was not possible to create a credible synthesis as they tackle fundamentally different 
problems: categorising moral discourse and analysing interpersonal relationships. Haidt sought to 
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broaden the inquiry to understand how morality varies across cultures and to specify universals of 
human nature, the result was Moral Foundations Theory (Graham et al., 2012). 
2.4.2. Theoretical Underpinnings 
There are four fundamental claims that underpin Moral Foundations Theory, and its credibility 
relies on these claims not being disproven or generally abandoned by psychologists. The four 
claims are: nativism, cultural learning, intuitionism and pluralism (Graham et al., 2012).  
Nativism here according to Haidt refers to the claim that, while some morality is innate, it is also 
malleable to environmental influences. That the genes imbed a certain degree of moral knowledge 
into neural tissue and this is revised through childhood (and to a lesser extent) adulthood (Graham 
et al., 2012). This is supported by studies like Mineka and Cook (1988) whereby young rhesus 
monkeys, exposed once to footage of an older monkey responding fearfully to a plastic snake or to 
plastic flowers, then learned to be fearful of the snake, but not the flowers. Something innate 
facilitated the fear of the snake, but not the flowers, after just one exposure and Haidt argues that 
morality works in the same way. 
Sperber (2005) proposes a version of modularity theory in which there are “learning modules” 
present at or shortly after a child’s birth whose function it is to generate a host of more specific 
modules as the child develops. This concept forms the theoretical basis for the moral foundation, 
as Haidt claims that children will “employ their innately given moral foundations within a particular 
cultural context” (Graham et al., 2012, p. 10). The cultural context then determines to which extent 
these foundations are actualised and the prominence they will assume in an individual’s life. This 
cultural learning is claimed to be what reinforces variations in morality across cultures. 
Much of the cognitive processes involved in decision making and evaluations are effortless, 
associative and heuristic and occur rapidly and automatically. This kind of processing is known as 
System 1 thinking (Kahneman, 2011) and Haidt argues that much of moral reasoning operates in 
the same manner (Haidt, 2001).  He has formalised this argument in the form of his Social 
Intuitionist Model, whereby moral intuition is defined as “the sudden appearance in consciousness, 
or at the fringe of consciousness, of an evaluative feeling (like–dislike, good–bad) about the 
character or actions of a person, without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of 
search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion” (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008, p. 188). The 
deliberative form of thinking (System 2) also has a moral counterpart, but Haidt argues that this is 
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enacted for socially strategic reasons; to account for the need to explain our judgements to others 
if required to do so. A form of motivated reasoning (Ditto, Pizarro, & Tannenbaum, 2009). 
Haidt asserts that due to the recurrent and varied nature of social challenges experienced by humans 
and our ancestors over millions of years, innate mental structures developed in response. The 
variation in these challenges in turn requires a diverse set of responses and Moral Foundations 
Theory is an attempt to identify the most effective modules in detecting relevant patterns in the 
social world and facilitating a response with the optimal motivational profile (Graham et al., 2012). 
Sperber’s (1994) modular cognitive organisation provides a robust theoretical basis for the 
existence of such delineated moral foundations. The variation in these identified modules and the 
social challenges they address is a pluralistic approach to understanding the origins of human 
morality, an approach which wholly underpins Moral Foundations Theory.  
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3. Epistemology & Methodology 
 
3.1. Triangulation 
The notion of triangulation of different methods in a research context has varying interpretations 
across social science academia, with some claiming that a convergence of results through both 
qualitative and quantitative methods can increase the validity of findings (Webb et al, 1966), 
whereas others assert that the aim of triangulation should be to produce differing elements of a 
multi-faceted reality, whereby more knowledge is generated about a particular phenomenon (Sale 
et al, 2002). In a general sense, it refers to “an epistemological claim concerning what more can be 
known about a phenomenon when the findings from data generated by two or more methods are 
brought together” (Moran-Ellis et al., 2006). In an inherently complex world, acknowledged as 
such by the metatheory of critical realism, a mixed methods approach to delineate the varied facets 
of reality—particularly with regards to socially produced phenomena—is not just justified, but can 
be preferable, as positivist, empirically focused approaches can only elucidate directly observable 
phenomenon. The complex social process of an individual’s political sense-making and subsequent 
actuation with political intent is one such phenomenon that cannot be purely empirically observed, 
and as such, calls out for a mixed methods triangulation of sorts. This thesis seeks to highlight areas 
of overlapping findings arrived at via different methodological processes—increasing the validity 
of these findings—while also providing the premise for delineating distinct, yet related mental 
processes, all of which are argued to be elements of the multi-faceted political sense-making 
process. 
George Lakoff uses retroductive reasoning in his attempt to explain what unifies the diverse 
political positions of liberals and conservatives. His use of cognitive modelling to construct a model 
of how the mind—using natural cognitive apparatuses like conceptual metaphors and radial 
categories—engages in this task of political sense-making, is a constructivist approach to semiosis 
(Neimeyer & Levitt, 2001). The Contemporary Metaphor Theory on which it is based is justified 
by linguistic evidence of how metaphors are used to express sophisticated concepts, evidence 
gained through a discourse analysis of sorts across various domains of language. This assertion of 
the primacy of conceptual metaphor in how humans perceive and make sense of the world is then 
used as the basis for constructing such conceptual metaphors that explain the collections of liberal 
and conservative political positions. It is reinforced by the claim that much of moral reasoning is 
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metaphorical in nature, and thus, the moral element of political sense-making can be traced back 
to the core conceptual metaphors of the nation as family, and the strict father and nurturant parent 
models of family. The qualitative, constructivist nature of the discourse analysis underpinning 
Contemporary Metaphor Theory and the strict father and nurturant parent conceptual metaphors 
emerging from the use of this framework to study political sense-making, is what led to the adoption 
of Lakoff’s analysis of this phenomenon as one component in its mixed methods triangulation.  
The evolution of our understanding of the moral domain has formed the basis of Jonathan Haidt’s 
formulation of Moral Foundations Theory. By studying the variation in moral matrices across 
cultures and considering an evolutionary perspective in how this relates to adaptive challenges that 
our ancestors faced for many thousands of years, Haidt is taking an interdisciplinary approach to 
conceptualising our moral bandwidth. This is further reinforced by his incorporation of Sperber’s 
(1994) cognitive modules concept spawning from the field of cognitive anthropology. This first 
attempt at the delineation of humans’ moral bandwidth enabled the design of a questionnaire that 
further particularised this delineation across the political spectrum. The combination of a 
qualitative synthesis of evolutionary and moral psychology and the quantitative verification of the 
moral foundations formulated by Haidt make this undertaking a mixed methods approach to 
understanding the role of morality in political sense-making. In combination with the qualitative, 
constructivist approach by Lakoff to illuminate the role of morality and conceptual metaphor in 
political sense-making, a second methodological perspective is added to the triangulation process. 
By utilising neuroimaging to study the reactions and specific regions of the brain relating to 
politically oriented stimuli, Drew Westen has provided evidence for the primacy of emotion in 
influencing individuals’ process of political sense-making. His focus on delineating the regions that 
are most heavily involved both in processing inputs of a political nature and manifesting the 
cognitive reflexes that are critical to understand for those wishing to influence people with political 
messaging, is a positivist, empirically-based approach to understanding how generating particular 
emotional reactions in large numbers of people can have either a crucially positive or negative 
impact on political campaigns. Including a positivistic, reductionist approach such as this in the 
task of understanding the political sense-making process provides a third methodological 
perspective to the triangulation process. 
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The use of differing methods with differing epistemological groundings by these three researchers 
to derive varied types of data all relating to the same phenomenon enables its multi-faceted, 
contingent nature to be explored. Contemporary Metaphor Theory and the morality-based central 
conceptual metaphors it effectuates are a constructivist, theoretical attempt to generate a framework 
for explaining the political positions of liberals and conservatives, whereas Moral Foundations 
Theory provides empirical evidence of the relative primacy of specific moral tenets for these two 
groups and both theories contribute towards the ability to determine effective communications 
strategies to target these groups. The overlapping elements in these analyses provide foci of 
particular interest, as these components that have been derived through inherently different 
approaches, with differing theoretical backgrounds, are perhaps touching on the same elements of 
this socially constructed reality. The role of emotion is tightly related to that of morality in the 
process of political sense-making and Westen’s positivistic contribution to delineating the physical 
brain structures and imaging partisans’ emotional reflexes to political communications provides 
compelling evidence for the primacy of emotion in this process and on which emotional triggers 
can be utilised by political strategists. 
3.2. Theory Synthesis 
The notion of integrating distinct theories into a synthesis that leads to a gestalt not previously 
describable within the confines of one theoretical framework has existed within the field of 
sociology for decades (Pound & Campbell, 2015). However, in recent years the concept of theory 
synthesis has been embraced across a broader range of academic disciplines, including international 
relations (Moravcsik, 2003), public health (Pound & Campbell, 2015), political science (Andreatta 
& Koenig-Archibugi, 2010), criminology (Bernard & Snipes, 1996), and psychotherapy (Gaete & 
Gaete, 2015). The central tenet of theory synthesis is to “…compare and weave together specific, 
related theories of interest” (Pound & Campbell, 2015, p. 58) in a way that provides a greater level 
of insight on the chosen topic of investigation. A purely positivistic approach to this endeavour, 
whereby ‘the truth’ can be found by combining disparate theories is criticised by Smith (2003) as 
overly simplistic, but there are multiple forms of theory synthesis and these must be adopted 
according to the specific characteristics of the phenomenon under investigation. Jupille et al (2003) 
assert four modes of theory synthesis: competitive testing; additive theory based on complementary 
domains of application; sequencing of theories; and incorporation/subsumption. An additive 
approach, which attempts to “…build a more comprehensive composite in which the whole 
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provides some gains over partial representations, all the while preserving the integrity of the 
contributing parts” (Jupille et al, 2003, p. 19) is suggested as being the most appropriate for the 
task undertaken in this thesis. This is in part because it allows for theories with differing 
epistemological foundations to contribute to a more meaningful gestalt, but also because its aims 
are relatively modest compared to other more in-depth syntheses which would be beyond the scope 
of this thesis. The theories of Lakoff and Haidt—namely Contemporary Metaphor Theory and 
Moral Foundations Theory—are brought together and compared while also synthesised in 
conjunction with the concept of individualisation to illuminate its potential political ramifications. 
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4. Literature Review 
 
The three authors whose work is central to this thesis (George Lakoff, Jonathan Haidt, and Drew 
Westen) provide three attempts at understanding the role that morality and emotions play in 
political sense-making and practice. They utilise different theoretical approaches to support their 
theses, but all are seeking to illuminate the complex nature of an individual’s process of political 
ideation and ideology formation as well as investigate the conventional wisdom that reason plays 
a central role in these processes. The diverse theoretical approaches of these three authors are 
explored below. 
4.1. George Lakoff 
 
The notion of conceptual metaphors playing a dominant role in an individual’s ability to explain 
complex phenomena is George Lakoff’s central thesis. Conceptual metaphors are defined by 
Lakoff as a “correspondence between concepts across conceptual domains, allowing forms of 
reasoning and words from one domain to be used in another” (Lakoff, 1996, p. 63). These 
conceptual metaphors are claimed by Lakoff to be commonly fixed in our conceptual systems, to 
frequently contribute to our everyday modes of thought, and importantly, are used without effort 
or conscious awareness, yet play a significant role in characterising an individual’s worldview. 
While much of Lakoff’s early work aimed to consolidate the robustness of the case for the centrality 
of conceptual metaphor in everyday life (Lakoff, 1992; Lakoff & Johnson, 1983; Lakoff & Turner, 
1989), in the last two decades, he has spent considerable effort in applying this insight to the realm 
of political behaviour theory. Moral Politics (1996) is a consolidation of the case for both 
conceptual metaphor and for that of moral reasoning as metaphorical reasoning, specifically in 
relation to determining an individual’s political ideology. 
Cognitive science serves as the academic basis for Lakoff’s claim on the importance of conceptual 
metaphor in explaining moral reasoning and political ideology. Cognitive scientists have studied 
the nature of common-sense reasoning extensively and found it to be primarily subconscious, in 
that individuals are not aware of the process involved in such reasoning. While the notion of 
common-sense may seem uncontentious, cognitive scientists such as Lakoff argue that there are 
deep, sophisticated, complex and subtle processes at play when one is engaging in common-sense 
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reasoning, and that common-sense reasoning has a conceptual structure that lies beneath an 
individual’s conscious awareness (Lakoff, 1996). It is the common-sense nature of political 
discourse that makes it appealing to study from a cognitive science perspective.  
Another central component of Lakoff’s research that relates to his thesis on political metaphorical 
reasoning is that of radial categories. Radial categories are the most common form of conceptual 
categories and are characterised not by properties shared by every member of the category, but by 
variations on a central model (Lakoff, 1996). The example provided by Lakoff is that of the concept 
of a mother; wherein the central model is defined by a mother giving birth to a child, caring for that 
child, imparting half of her genes onto that child and being the wife of the father of that child. 
However, there are numerous variations on this central model, but all can still be considered a 
mother, for example: a foster mother, stepmother, surrogate mother and adoptive mother. The 
central model of a mother here is a subclass of prototype, with other subclasses being ideal case, 
typical case, anti-ideal case, stereotype, salient exemplar and an essential prototype. Lakoff argues 
that the central model prototype can be used to delineate types of conservatives and liberals1. The 
central task of Moral Politics (1996), relatedly, is to provide a theory of what determines the 
parameters of variation between these conservatives and liberals; to explain why conservatives and 
liberals have the clusters of policies they have. The varying policy positions held by liberals and 
conservatives are often seen as puzzling and lacking a coherent ideology by those on the opposing 
side. For example, liberals are puzzled by conservatives’ support for the right-to-life coinciding 
with support for the death penalty or lack of support for prenatal care programs that save the lives 
of newborn babies, or their support for increases in spending on the military, police and prisons 
under the guise of protection, but see regulation that protects individuals from predatory business 
practices as a form of interference, rather than protection. Conversely, conservatives see as 
puzzling, liberals’ support for abortion coinciding with advocating for welfare and education 
policies for children, their support for labour while simultaneously advocating for regulations that 
may limit development and eliminate jobs, or their claim to be for equality of opportunity existing 
alongside support for affirmative action.  
                                               
1 Liberal will be used henceforth to describe individuals that identify with progressive, left-wing political ideology, 
as this is the terminology utilised in the USA and therefore used by all three authors centrally featured in this thesis. 
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Lakoff proposes three adequacy conditions that he asserts should be met by any model that explains 
liberal and conservative worldviews. The model must: explain why certain stands on issues go 
together, explain why the policy positions held by liberals and conservatives are often puzzling for 
the other side, and explain the topic choice, word choice, and forms of reasoning in liberal and 
conservative discourse. Through a process of retroductive reasoning—that is, asking what makes 
X possible, whereby X is conservative and liberal worldviews—Lakoff provides such a model, 
with two central conceptual metaphors, the Strict Father model and Nurturant Parent model, 
representing the conservative and liberal worldviews respectively. The unifying metaphor that 
underlies both of these models is that of the nation-as-family, which Lakoff argues is commonplace, 
unconscious and automatic, and provides the link between family-based morality and politics. 
Lakoff claims that within this metaphor, the government is seen as an older male that protects its 
citizens as a father would protect his children. The examples of commonplace language like the 
‘fatherland’, ‘Uncle Sam’ and ‘Big Brother’ are used to support this claim. Another important claim 
that supports Lakoff’s central metaphorical models is that much of moral reasoning is metaphorical 
reasoning. A conclusion derived from the cognitive studies literature is that moral reasoning is 
imaginative and that it depends fundamentally on metaphorical understanding (Churchland, 1995; 
Flanagan, 1991; Johnson, 1993). Johnson (1993) emphasises this claim:  
We human beings are imaginative creatures, from our most mundane, automatic acts of 
perception, all the way up to our most abstract conceptualisation and reasoning. 
Consequently, our moral understanding depends in large measure on various structures 
of imagination, such as images, image schemas, metaphors, narratives, and so forth. 
Moral reasoning is thus basically an imaginative activity, because it uses imaginatively 
structured concepts and requires imagination to discern what is morally relevant in 
situations, to understand empathetically how others experience things, and to envision 
the full range of possibilities open to us in a particular case.2 
Lakoff is quick to stress that not all morality is metaphorical in nature, and in fact it is the non-
metaphorical aspects of morality—those related to the experience of wellbeing—upon which the 
system of metaphors for morality is based. These aspects of morality that promote the experiential 
wellbeing of others and the avoidance of experiential harm to others include being: healthy as 
                                               
2 Johnson, (1993) Moral Imagination, preface 
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opposed to sick, wealthy as opposed to poor, strong as opposed to weak, and free rather than 
imprisoned. As it is better to be wealthy than poor, strong rather than weak, or healthy rather than 
sick, morality is often conceptualised in terms of these preferable states of wellbeing and, 
consequently, it follows that such non-metaphorical morality is the basis for metaphorical morality. 
For example, a fear of the dark has spawned the conception of evil as dark, and good as light, and 
the notion that walking upright is superior to falling down has led to the conception of morality as 
uprightness (Lakoff, 1996). The aforementioned forms of experiential wellbeing are universal 
around the world, and as such, the same metaphors for morality appear in culture after culture. The 
‘nation as family’ metaphor is likewise noticeable in many other countries, with Mother Russia, 
Mother India and Mother England all found in the vernacular of these countries. Lakoff asserts 
that this nation as family metaphor is what links conservative and liberal worldviews to his two 
models based around the central conceptual metaphors of the Strict Father and Nurturant Parent. 
4.1.1. Strict Father 
 
The Strict Father model proposed by Lakoff represents a distinct moral system in which the world 
is understood as a fundamentally dangerous place, with evils lurking everywhere, including within 
the human soul and survival relies on discipline, obedience to moral authority, and observance of 
a defined moral order. This Strict Father model is as follows: 
A traditional nuclear family, with the father having primary responsibility for 
supporting and protecting the family as well as the authority to set overall family policy. 
He teaches children right from wrong by setting strict rules for their behaviour and 
enforcing them through punishment. The punishment is typically mild to moderate, but 
sufficiently painful. It is commonly corporal punishment—say, with a belt or a stick. 
He also gains their cooperation by showing love and appreciation when they do follow 
the rules. But children must never be coddled, lest they become spoiled; a spoiled child 
will be dependent for life and will not learn proper morals. The mother has a day-to-
day responsibility for the care of the house, raising the children, and upholding the 
father's authority. Children must respect and obey their parents, partly for their own 
safety and partly because by doing so they build character, that is, self-discipline and 
self-reliance. Love and nurturance are a vital part of family life, but should never 
outweigh parental authority, which is itself an expression of love and nurturance—
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tough love. Self-discipline, self-reliance and respect for legitimate authority are the 
crucial things that a child must learn. A mature adult becomes self-reliant through 
applying self-discipline in pursuing his self-interest. Only if a child learns self-
discipline can he become self-reliant later in life. Survival is a matter of competition, 
and only through self-discipline can a child learn to compete successfully. The mature 
children of the Strict Father have to sink or swim by themselves. They are on their own 
and have to prove their responsibility and self-reliance. They have attained, through 
discipline, authority over themselves. They must, and are competent to, make their own 
decisions. They must protect themselves and their families. They know what is good 
for them better than their parents, who are distant from them. Good parents do not 
meddle or interfere in their lives. Any parental meddling or interference is strongly 
resented.3 
Three central themes arise from this model (Lakoff, 1996, p. 68) with important implications for 
the potential impact on political sense-making from a conservative worldview: 
• Self-discipline is very important, because the world is difficult, and it is therefore necessary 
to survive. If you are obedient, you will become self-disciplined, leading to success, 
meaning therefore, that success is moral. 
• Competition is moral, because it shows who is self-disciplined and is a condition for the 
development and sustenance of the right kind of person. Correspondingly, restraints on 
competition are immoral; they inhibit the development and sustenance of the ‘right’ kind 
of person, and consequently, meritocracy is desirable, as is hierarchy; some people have 
authority over others, and their authority is legitimate. 
• Those with legitimate authority have a responsibility to exercise it for the benefit of those 
under their authority. This includes: maintaining order; sustaining and defending the 
system of authority itself, using their authority to protect those under it, and working for 
the benefit of those under their authority, especially helping create self-disciplined people. 
                                               
3 Lakoff, (1996) Moral Politics, p. 65 
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These themes are in addition to numerous moral priorities, which are implicitly accepted when this 
model of the family is accepted. Many of these moral priorities also manifest as metaphors under 
the Strict Father model according to Lakoff and these moral priorities make up what Lakoff refers 
to as Strict Father morality. Some of the key metaphoric moral priorities are described below.  
Moral Strength 
This metaphor is central to Strict Father morality and embodies the notions that being bad is 
being ‘low’, being good is being ‘upright’, doing evil is ‘falling’ (e.g. falling from grace), evil 
is a ‘force’ that can make you ‘fall’ or commit immoral acts, and that morality is ‘strength’ that 
can stand up to evil and which is built through self-discipline and denial. This metaphor 
provides a mode of unconscious reasoning; that anything that promotes moral weakness is 
immoral, for example, welfare that disincentivises work, and unconsciously reasoning in this 
manner leads to these assertions becoming common sense. It also excludes explanations 
relating to social forces or class. An important ramification of this metaphor is that one is not 
born with moral strength, but rather it must be built. It follows from this that we all start out as 
morally weak and with an overwhelming tendency to do immoral things, and unless our parents 
intervene to discipline us, we will naturally become immoral. 
Moral Authority 
This metaphor is patterned on parental authority, whereby the authority figure sets standards 
of behaviour and punishes those that do not meet these standards. Moral behaviour by one 
subjected to authority is obedience to the authority figure, and conversely, the exertion of moral 
authority is moral behaviour on the part of the authority figure, providing they are using it 
legitimately. Failure to assert authority by setting standards of behaviour and enforcing them 
through punishment is therefore immoral. A resentment toward ‘illegitimate authority’ occurs 
when the conditions for legitimacy of parental authority are not met. This occurs when one 
subject to authority claims to know better than the authority figure what their and their 
community’s best interests are and is capable of acting in these best interests in place of the 
authority figure and also when the authority figure is acting against these best interests. The 
federal government is a common target for this sentiment (Lakoff, 1996). As other countries 
have different manifestations of the endpoint of legitimate parental authority over their children 
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and of the age of full autonomy of children from their parents (i.e. Italy, France, Spain, China, 
Israel (Lakoff, 1996)), it is expected that unlike in the USA, the perception of illegitimate 
parental meddling in one’s life is less pronounced in the versions of Strict Father morality in 
these countries, and the relationship between citizens of these countries and their governments 
is indeed less adversarial in this respect. 
Moral Order 
The moral order metaphor is based on a folk theory of the natural order in which the natural 
order is the order of dominance that occurs in the world. This metaphor legitimises perceived 
“natural” power relations into a hierarchy of moral authority whereby certain groups have 
moral authority over others (Lakoff, 1996). For example, God over people, people over nature, 
adults over children and men over women. However, with this moral authority comes 
responsibility for the wellbeing of those lower in the hierarchy. This moral hierarchy serves to 
legitimate the existing power relations between groups in society as being natural and thus 
makes social movements seeking to disrupt these power dynamics such as feminism appear 
immoral. In addition to this, it legitimates the view of nature as a resource for humans and 
delegitimates the notion of an inherent value of nature and provides justification for those that 
argue for a natural superiority, like white supremacists, Nietzsche’s moral theory claiming the 
moral authority of nobility over commoners, the Nazi claim that Aryans ranked higher in the 
moral order than Jews or Gypsies, or Calvinist ideals of the moral relativity of rich and poor 
people. The notion of moral superiority of rich people over poor fits particularly snugly within 
the American Strict Father morality, as the notion of the American Dream can easily be 
interpreted that if you are too lazy or untalented to achieve it, then you deserve poverty.  
Moral Wholeness 
Strict father morality requires that there are natural, strict, uniform, unchanging standards of 
behaviour that must be followed if society is to function, and one way to conceptualise uniform 
standards of behaviour is through the metaphor of moral wholeness (Lakoff, 1996, p. 90). 
Wholeness entails a homogeneity and unity of form which makes an entity strong and resistant 
to pressures as well as stable and predictable in the way it functions. In this regard, wholeness 
is perceived as moral, whereas degeneration is immoral. The consequences of this metaphorical 
27 
 
mode of thought are considerable, as moral standards that change with time, social situation, 
or ethnicity are perceived to be a danger to the functioning of society. Progress in morality 
consequently does not exist, it is permanently fixed, and any so-called moral progress is rather 
an evil that chips away at the moral foundations upon which society rests. 
Moral Purity 
Many linguistic examples showcase the relevance of concept of moral purity, as an undesirable 
act can be “disgusting”, much as an undesirable character can be “dirty”, or someone that has 
yet to lose their innocence is known as “pure” and a city that is perceived to be in moral decline 
needs to be “cleaned up”. The implications of this metaphor are profound; “just as physical 
impurities can ruin a substance, so moral impurities can ruin a person or society, and just as 
substances, to be usable, must be purged of impurities, so societies, to be viable, must be purged 
of corrupting individuals or practices.” (Lakoff, 1996, p. 92)  
Moral Self-Interest 
The pursuit of self-interest in the Strict Father model of the family is seen as moral, as it can 
only be achieved through self-reliance attained by maintaining self-discipline. So long as it is 
not conflicting with other moral priorities like authority and strength, the pursuit of self-interest 
serves as a link between these Strict Father morals of self-reliance and self-discipline and is 
seen as leading to an increase in wellbeing for all, as it represents a metaphorical version of 
Adam Smith’s invisible hand. This also helps to explain the strong link between conservative 
ideology and free-market economics. Conversely, interference in the free-market is seen as 
preventing the moral pursuit of self-interest and is to be resisted accordingly. 
The moral metaphors that constitute the Strict Father model are not exclusive to it, rather they are 
commonly found in other cultures and contexts and occur in other moral systems. It is the particular 
nature in which they are collated and organised that creates the specific emotional and logic 
dynamic of Strict Father morality; an elaborate, unified moral system based on a specific 
interpretation of family life that provides moral guidance across a number of realms relevant in the 
development of a political ideology. The differing relationships between adult offspring and their 
parents and corresponding variation in tolerance for ongoing authority and input provide the 
potential for culture-specific variations on the Strict Father model, but the universal nature of much 
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of its metaphorical moral composition suggests that it is a valid model through which to interpret 
the conservative political ideologies found in other cultures around the world. The moral 
metaphors discussed above, and others are said by Lakoff to exist in a hierarchy, whereby priority 
in the mind of those engaging with Strict Father morality is heeded to the Strength Group of 
metaphors (moral strength, moral order, moral wholeness, moral purity etc.) above moral self-
interest which is above moral nurturance in last place. 
4.1.2. Nurturant Parent 
Lakoff’s Nurturant Parent model is primarily oriented around the concept of empathy, as nurturance 
can only be provided once one is able to empathise with the needs of those who require nurturing. 
Based around a concept of an ideal family, it similarly to the Strict Father model assumes that the 
model of childrearing will be reproduced in the child, although this results in self-nurturance in the 
Nurturant Parent model as opposed to self-discipline in the Strict Father model. The Nurturant 
Parent model is as follows: 
 
A family of preferably two parents, but perhaps only one. If two, the parents share 
household responsibilities. The primal experience behind this model is one of being 
cared for and cared about, having one's desires for loving interactions met, living as 
happily as possible, and deriving meaning from mutual interaction and care. Children 
develop best through their positive relationships to others, through their contribution to 
their community, and through the ways in which they realise their potential and find 
joy in life. Children become responsible, self-disciplined, and self-reliant through being 
cared for and respected, and through caring for others. Support and protection are part 
of nurturance, and they require strength and courage on the part of parents. The 
obedience of children comes out of their love and respect for their parents, not out of 
the fear of punishment. Open, two-way, mutually respectful communication is crucial. 
If parents' authority is to be legitimate, they must tell children why their decisions serve 
the cause of protection and nurturance. The questioning of parents by children is 
positive, since children need to learn why parents do what they do, since children often 
have good ideas that should be taken seriously, and since all family members should 
participate in important decisions. Responsible parents, of course, have to make the 
ultimate decisions and that must be clear. Protection is a form of caring, and protection 
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from external dangers takes up a significant part of the nurturant parent's attention. The 
world is filled with evils that can harm a child, and it is the nurturant parent's duty to 
ward them off. Crime and drugs are, of course, significant, but so are less obvious 
dangers: cigarettes, cars without seatbelts, dangerous toys, inflammable clothing, 
pollution, asbestos, lead paint, pesticides in food, diseases, unscrupulous businessmen, 
and so on. Protection of innocent and helpless children from such evils is a major part 
of a nurturant parent's job. The principal goal of nurturance is for children to be fulfilled 
and happy in their lives and to become nurturant themselves. A fulfilling life is assumed 
to be, in significant part, a nurturant life, one committed to family and community 
responsibility. Self-fulfillment and the nurturance of others are seen as inseparable. 
What children need to learn is empathy for others, the capacity for nurturance, 
cooperation, and the maintenance of social ties, which cannot be done without the 
strength, respect, self-discipline, and self-reliance that comes through being cared for 
and caring. Raising a child to be fulfilled also requires helping that child develop his or 
her potential for achievement and enjoyment. That requires respecting the child's own 
values and allowing the child to explore the range of ideas and options that the world 
offers. When children are respected, nurtured, and communicated with from birth, they 
gradually enter into a lifetime relationship of mutual respect, communication, and 
caring with their parents. 
This model is based on a very different set of metaphors for morality than the Strict Father model, 
as it emphasises empathy, nurturance, self-nurturance, social ties, fairness and happiness, with the 
two moral metaphors given the greatest primacy being morality as empathy and morality as 
nurturance. The key moral metaphors of Nurturant Parent morality are outlined further below. 
Morality as Nurturance 
Nurturance presupposes empathy, as in order to care for another being, one must first 
care about that being and be able to sense what they require. Insofar as a child has a right 
to be nurtured and a parent has a duty to care for their child, the metaphor of morality as 
nurturance embodies the primacy of nurturance to the liberal ideology, whereby this 
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family-based morality is projected onto society as a whole. Morality as nurturance can 
be described by the following conceptual metaphor: 
• The community is a family 
• Moral agents are nurturing parents 
• People needing help are children needing nurturance 
• Moral action is nurturance  
(Lakoff, 1996, p. 117) 
There are a number of elements of this metaphor that relate it to how individuals perceive society 
and their and their government’s role within it. These include: 
• To nurture children, one must have absolute and regular empathy with them 
• To act morally toward people needing help to survive, one must have absolute 
and regular empathy with them 
• Nurturance may require making sacrifices to care for children 
• Moral action may require making sacrifices to help truly needy people 
(Lakoff, 1996, p. 117) 
This can be extended if one also conceptualises their community as family: 
• Family members have a responsibility to see that children in their family are 
nurtured 
• Community members have a responsibility to see that people needing help in 
their community are helped 
(Lakoff, 1996, p. 117) 
The morality as nurturance metaphor is the overarching metaphoric element of the Nurturant 
Parent model and encapsulates a number of other encompassed metaphors including morality as 
empathy, moral self-nurturance, morality as self-development and morality as fair distribution 
which are outlined below. 
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Morality as Empathy 
As one cannot literally project one’s consciousness into another’s being to feel what 
another feels, the notion of empathy is fundamentally metaphorical. To try and imagine 
what another feels is the core of what it means to be empathetic towards another, however 
there are variations on the central concept of empathy, including absolute, egocentric and 
affordable empathy. Absolute empathy is truly feeling what another feels without some 
disclaimer or condition, whereas egocentric empathy is projecting one’s capacity to feel 
while maintaining their own values. Affordable empathy is simply the empathy that well-
off people are able show to those less fortunate than themselves, something that those 
similarly unfortunate are often not able to do. The central logic of morality as empathy is 
that having felt another’s individual perception, one would want the other to experience 
a sense of wellbeing and therefore be motivated to engender it in them.  
Moral Self-Nurturance/Morality as Self-Development 
In order to maintain a nurturant mindset, Lakoff argues that one must be nurturant 
towards oneself, ensuring that one’s basic needs (health, job, personal relationships etc.) 
are being maintained and accordingly, not allowing oneself to operate continually in a 
mode of selflessness. Selflessness is described as putting the needs of others ahead of 
one’s own and goes beyond nurturance as maintaining this mode of operation can lead to 
burnout. Lakoff distinguishes between moral self-nurturance and morality as self-
development as two distinct but equal subsects of the morality as nurturance metaphor, 
but whereas moral self-nurturance refers to the need to nurture oneself in order to 
continue nurturing others, morality as self-development refers to the pursuit of one’s 
desire to increase empathy, help others, nurture social ties, make people happy or increase 
one’s own capacity for happiness. These can desires can manifest in activities like 
meditation, development of artistic skills, attainment of education, experiences in nature 
and community service. 
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Morality as Fair Distribution 
In an ideal family, each child would receive equal levels of nurturance and parents would 
share the burdens of parenthood equally and this notion is behind the morality of fair 
distribution metaphor within Nurturant Parent morality. As there are many models of fair 
distribution (equality of distribution, equality of opportunity, procedural distribution, 
rights-based fairness, needs-based fairness, scalar distribution etc.) a number of these can 
be found within the Nurturant Parent model, but they arise according to the relevant 
context as is the case with parenting; based on the relevant conditions of family life. 
Lakoff argues that this metaphor is a cornerstone of Nurturant Parent morality (Lakoff, 
1996, p. 124).  
Moral Self-Interest 
Lakoff is careful to distinguish moral self-interest from notions of moral self-
development, morality as self-nurturance and the pursuit of happiness in the service of 
others. He argues that the latter all are involved in and foster interdependence, rather than 
independence and autonomy of the individual and that the claims that they are in the 
pursuit of self-interest by some theorists are not true within the system of Nurturant 
Parent morality. However, he argues that with the constraints on the application of moral 
self-interest within Nurturant Parent morality, the pursuit of self-interest once these 
constraints are met is perfectly moral and is a component of the moral system. 
Lakoff asserts that as with the Strict Father model, there is a hierarchy in the moral values in the 
Nurturant Parent morality. It is argued that the Nurturance Group (moral nurturance, moral 
empathy, moral self-development, morality as fair distribution etc.) are the top moral priorities 
followed by moral self-interest and lastly the Strength Group (moral strength, moral order, moral 
wholeness, moral purity etc.).  
4.1.3. Applications 
The implications of these moral hierarchies are profound assuming they are accurate, as it suggests 
a blueprint for targeting individuals with political communications. That is precisely what Lakoff 
has used this conceptualisation of the moral basis of conservative and liberal politics to do. Lakoff 
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suggests that by focusing on the language by which politicians address the public, it is possible to 
reframe key issues and therefore make them more palatable or relevant for different groups. As 
conservatives and liberals are asserted to exist in radial categories, not in uniform, clearly defined 
archetypes, he asserts that it is possible to devise framing techniques that activate individuals that 
Lakoff labels biconceptuals; progressive on some issues, conservative on others (Lakoff, 2014). 
By carefully selecting language and phrasing that activates the Nurturant Parent model, rather than 
the Strict Father model, which he asserts is also running in these biconceptuals, it is possible to 
actuate these individuals to support progressive causes. Potential specific strategies and language 
selection will be discussed further in the recommendations chapter. 
4.2. Jonathan Haidt 
With the use of three central metaphors, Jonathan Haidt conceptualises the three principles of moral 
psychology, also being the three central tenets of his book The Righteous Mind (2012). These are 
outlined below and used as a starting point to explore the key findings of this text, a seminal 
contribution towards understanding the interplay of intuition, morality and reason in political sense-
making. 
4.2.1. Intuitions Before Reasoning 
Conventional liberal political wisdom is that, given sufficient information about the issues and 
policies spruiked by liberal political parties, a majority of the population will reason their way to 
accepting that these issues are relevant and that the proposed policies are in their best interests and 
therefore worth voting for. Haidt refutes this and asserts that intuitions—moral intuitions more 
specifically—are by far the dominant factor in explaining people’s perspectives. In a similar vein 
to David Hume’s assertion that reason is the “slave of the passions” (Hume, 1969 [1939/40, p. 462), 
Haidt argues that reasoning is done primarily post-hoc and in response to an immediate, 
subconscious intuition, and that this also applies to moral reasoning. He provides supporting 
examples of interview responses from people asked about the moral acceptability of hypothetical 
actions that could be perceived as disgusting or taboo, but specifically constructed without the 
potential for harm to oneself or others, in which subjects continually invented victims of harm that 
contradicted the details of the question (Haidt et al., 1993). What’s more, when corrected on these 
details, they would often invent another victim, demonstrating this process of post-hoc moral 
reasoning to justify a position landed upon, immediately and subconsciously, through moral 
34 
 
intuition. When it became too difficult to conjure another victim, many people became morally 
“dumbfounded”, insisting the action was still morally wrong, but without being able to reason their 
way to an answer as to why.  
Haidt provides a number of major research findings beyond his own observations that support this 
notion of intuitions coming before reason. Robert Zajonc, leaning on the 1890’s doctrine of 
“affective primacy” (Wundt, 1896), uncovered what he called the “mere exposure effect” whereby 
exposing individuals to words or images repeatedly led to a greater affinity for those words or 
images (Zajonc, 1968). Based on these findings, he advocated for a dual-process model in which 
affect or “feeling” precedes thinking and asserted that affective reactions “reduce the universe of 
alternatives” available to later thinking (Zajonc, 1980). This model was supported by findings that 
exposure to words of a positive or negative nature or “affective priming” can create a pre-judgement 
of the word or image that follows it (Fazio et al, 1986; Greenwald et al, 1998) and similarly, that 
prejudices against political candidates could be measured by using their names as primes in the 
same fashion (Morris et al, 2003). Sensory stimulation of the disgust and displeasure responses in 
subjects has been shown to also negatively affect responses to survey questions (Schnall et al, 2008; 
Eskine et al, 2011), while feelings of cleanliness or dirtiness has been shown to sway responses to 
questions of morality and political ideology in similarly designed studies (Zhong, et al, 2010; 
Helzer & Pizarro, 2011). Neuroscientists have recently been studying the regions of the brain that 
correlate with emotional processing to see how they respond to scenarios relating to moral 
violations, charitable donations, assigning punishment for crimes, playing games with cheaters and 
co-operators (Rilling et al, 2008; Sanfey et al, 2003) and inducing deontological versus utilitarian 
judgements relating to the saving or sacrificing of human lives (Greene et al, 2001). These results 
show consistently that when faced with these kinds of morally charged scenarios, the areas of 
participants’ brains associated with emotional processing activate almost immediately. This is 
significant, as high activity in these areas correlates with the kinds of moral judgements or decisions 
that participants eventually make (Greene et al, 2009). 
Haidt uses the metaphor of a rider sitting on an elephant to describe the interplay between intuition 
and reason, whereby the elephant represents the automatic processes that operate within the 
subconscious including intuition and the rider represents the controlled processes like (moral) 
reasoning. The metaphor conveys that the rider has evolved to serve the elephant, and as with the 
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relative discrepancy in their sizes, the rider is only able to affect minimal control over the elephant, 
representing the primacy with which moral intuitions affect our perspective and the post-hoc role 
of reasoning. The implication from this is that in order to reach an individual through discussion or 
argumentation regarding a moral or political issue, it is important to address the ‘elephant’ or that 
individual’s moral intuitions in order to be effective. To do this however, it is necessary to 
understand from where these moral intuitions originate and to have a model for tailoring these 
communications to capture the variation in moral intuition that exists across cultures and the 
spectrum of political ideology.  
4.2.2. Moral Foundations Theory 
The second principle of moral psychology that Haidt explores in The Righteous Mind (2012) is: 
there’s more to morality than harm and fairness. As discussed in chapter 2, WEIRD (western, 
educated, industrial, rich, developed) societies have been shown to have a generally narrower moral 
domain than those of other societies (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), with the care/justice 
paradigm playing a disproportionate role in the moral systems of WEIRD individuals that focus 
primarily on the ethic of autonomy (Haidt, 2012). Attempts to broaden the scope of study beyond 
individuals from WEIRD countries, particularly those that are educated and (upper-) middle class 
who are frequently recruited for academic studies out of sheer convenience (Arnett, 2008), show 
that the moral domain of individuals outside of WEIRD societies and within religious and 
conservative moral matrices within WEIRD societies is broader and commonly includes the ethics 
of community and divinity (Shweder et al, 1997). These findings are in line with Hume’s analogy 
of morality as the sensory experience of taste and the variable distinctions of it available to us from 
sweet to bitter (Hume, 1960 [1777]). Whereas much of the focus of moral sciences has been on the 
primacy of rationalist deontological or utilitarianist interpretations of morality favoured by earlier 
intellectuals like Immanuel Kant (1993 [1785]) and Jeremy Bentham (1996 [1789]), Hume before 
him and now Haidt, argue for a more descriptive, pluralist approach to understanding the moral 
landscape. By drawing a link between anthropology and evolutionary psychology, Haidt proposed 
that the notion of cognitive modularity—that areas of an animal’s brain evolve to respond to certain 
patterns in nature that assist in that animal’s survival—is relevant for understanding how morality 
develops differently in different contexts. It is understood that cognitive modules can have different 
triggers than those that they were adapted for (Sperber & Hirschfeld, 2004), and Haidt asserts that 
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this can be applied to the moral realm, where triggers can be shrunk or expanded depending on the 
societal context (Haidt, 2012). Out of the adaptive challenges faced in social life that evolutionary 
psychologists frequently wrote about, Haidt formulated what he considered to be the five cognitive 
modules that also correlate to the virtues that are found in some form in many cultures (Neuberg et 
al, 2010). These adaptive challenges are: caring for vulnerable children, forming partnerships with 
non-kin to reap the benefits of reciprocity, forming coalitions to compete with other coalitions, 
negotiating status hierarchies, and keeping oneself and one’s kin free from parasites and pathogens, 
which spread quickly when people live in close proximity to each other (Haidt, 2012, p. 146). 
Humanity’s understanding of innateness has developed considerably in recent decades; while 
previously any ‘innate’ human trait was considered necessarily to be hardwired, fixed, and 
immutable, it is now accepted as relating to something “organised in advance of experience” (Haidt, 
2012, p. 153), while concurrently malleable over time. The cognitive modules outlined above are 
claimed by Haidt to be such an example of innate human traits, and critically, that they interact 
with an individual’s environment, become triggered by different stimuli and with variable 
sensitivity. This attempt to describe the innate cognitive modules that relate to human morality 
resulted in the formulation of Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory, wherein the aforementioned 
adaptive challenges form the evolutionary basis for these modular moral foundations. The five 
original moral foundations are Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, Loyalty/Betrayal, 
Authority/Subversion, and Sanctity/Degradation. This was supplemented after the initial 
conceptualisation of the theory with the Liberty/Oppression foundation, which came about after 
the realisation that much of the desire for fairness expressed by individuals was related more so to 
proportionality than equality, and that there was another evolutionary adaptive challenge that 
demanded a response. Haidt argues it is that of living in small groups with individuals who would, 
given the chance, bully, dominate, and constrain others, with the original trigger being signs of 
attempted dominance over others (Haidt, 2012, p. 200). Haidt’s (currently) six moral foundations 
are outlined below. 
Care/Harm 
Evolving in response to the biological requirement of comprehensive and long-term care and 
protection of infants, the original trigger for this cognitive module was witnessing the suffering of 
one’s own children. However, as is the case for any cognitive module, there can be multiple triggers 
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and these triggers can change over time; we now care about many more classes of victims than half 
a century ago (Pinker, 2011). Skyrocketing rates of veganism in the US and UK in recent years are 
a demonstration of this, as a core reason for embracing a vegan diet is concern for the welfare of 
animals (GlobalData, 2017; Ipsos, 2016). 
Fairness/Cheating 
The theory of reciprocal altruism has helped humanity to explain non-kin altruism by asserting that 
when a species remembers previous interactions with others, an incentive is created to play a tit-
for-tat strategy in order to maximise an individual’s payoff (Trivers, 1971). This has also been 
shown to be the optimal strategy in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma developed in game theory, 
wherein players remember previous interactions and the decisions taken by a player’s opponent 
(Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). It is in response to this adaptive challenge of achieving reciprocity 
with non-kin individuals that has given rise to the Fairness/Cheating moral foundation. The original 
triggers for this module are acts of cooperation or selfishness towards oneself, but these have 
expanded and diverged in recent times across the political spectrum towards equality and social 
justice on the left, but more so towards proportionality and people receiving what they have 
‘earned’ on the right. 
Loyalty/Betrayal 
The prevalence of warfare in human societies over thousands of years points to the adaptive 
challenge of forming and maintaining coalitions to fend off rival groups in order to survive. This 
requires a trait that facilitates robust tribes and communities, and current day humans are the 
descendants of those that managed to do so, as opposed to those that lived a more individualistic 
existence. The original trigger for this module would have been anything that signified that your 
tribe member was committed to fighting for the benefit or survival of the tribe, but in the current 
day, humans have created elaborate outlets for this innate tendency, creating sport teams and 
political parties that encourage tribalism and displays of group loyalty. The reverse of this affinity 
towards loyal tribespeople or teammates is a hatred for traitors, which can manifest when a player 
requests a trade to another sport team, or when a liberal person expresses disdain for hostile foreign 
policy. The political divide existent within the loyalty/betrayal foundation will be discussed further 
below. 
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Authority/Subversion 
Social hierarchies exist not just across the full span of human history, but commonly within the 
animal kingdom. It is not the mere existence of these hierarchies that makes authority a compelling 
candidate for a moral foundation, but the legitimating nature of the responsibilities of leaders for 
their subordinates and their maintenance of order that pushes it into the moral domain. Original 
triggers of these modules include any behaviour that asserts authority or conveys submissiveness, 
but now comprise any kind of acts that could be construed as obedience, disobedience, respect, 
disrespect, submission, or rebellion towards legitimate forms of authority. 
Sanctity/Degradation 
The “omnivore’s dilemma” refers to an omnivore’s need to constantly explore new sources of food, 
while remaining wary of parasites, pathogens, and toxicity that could cause them harm (Rozin & 
Fallon, 1987), leading them to exhibit both neophilia and neophobia, simultaneously being attracted 
and fearful of new things. The interplay between them has implications for an individual’s political 
ideology, whereby liberals tend to exhibit a much stronger tendency to seek out new experiences 
whereas conservatives tend to stick with what they know and seek to protect existing paradigms 
and social structures (McCrae, 1996). The omnivore’s dilemma led to the evolution of the emotion 
of disgust in humans, a “behavioural immune response” that helps to prevent humans from being 
exposed to threats like those aforementioned (Schaller & Park, 2011), which was the adaptive 
challenge that drove the evolution of the Sanctity foundation. The experience of disgust at sights, 
smells or tastes that indicated proximate danger was the original trigger for this foundation, 
however, it has broadened extensively across different cultures, but commonly includes out-group 
members like immigrants and the perceived desecration of sacred objects or institutions. 
Liberty/Oppression 
While the majority of human history has consisted of egalitarian hunter-gatherer communities, it is 
suggested that humans are innately hierarchical, but underwent a “political transition” that enabled 
them to live in such egalitarian groups (Boehm, 1999), before the agricultural revolution catalysed 
the transition back into hierarchical societies. The tendency for groups to band together and strike 
down an alpha male that was abusing his position of authority enabled these egalitarian groups to 
prosper for thousands of years and living in a group with the ever-present threat of such an abuse 
of power is proposed by Haidt as the adaptive challenge from which the Liberty/oppression 
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foundation evolved. The original trigger for this was therefore signs of attempted domination over 
the group or its individual members, but this has since evolved into the perception of illegitimate 
restraints to one’s liberty. This can manifest in suspicion or outright contempt for government in 
conservatives, and similar sentiments towards unbridled capitalism and the extremely wealthy in 
liberals. 
4.2.3. Evidence for the Moral Foundations of Politics 
To test whether the moral foundations formulated by Haidt had a particular correlation with 
people’s political ideology he developed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) in 
collaboration with his colleagues Jesse Graham and Brian Nosek. The MFQ asked people how 
relevant considerations relating to each of the foundations were in judging whether something was 
right or wrong, from “extremely relevant” to “not at all relevant” and mapped this onto self-
identification of political ideology on a spectrum from “very liberal” to “very conservative”. The 
results were as they were expecting, with the care and hard foundations ranking high and the 
loyalty, authority and sanctity foundations ranking low for the most liberal respondents and a 
convergence occurring at the most conservative end of the spectrum with a gradual, but clear trend 
showing relatively lower relevance for the care and harm foundations and relatively higher 
relevance for the loyalty, authority and sanctity foundations. 
 
Figure 1. First evidence for Moral Foundations Theory (Graham, Haidt, Nosek, 2011, p. 184) 
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This survey was completed with 1,600 responses and was the first evidence of a clear distinction 
between liberals and conservatives and the relative weight that these specific moral foundations 
hold in reflecting their political orientation. The MFQ was further refined over the following years 
and was released on a designated website for garnering responses. It quickly achieved 132,000 
responses by 2011 and the results were even more emphatic; the downward gradient of the care 
and fairness foundations and the upward gradient of the loyalty, authority and sanctity foundations 
were much steeper than from the results of the first survey. 
 
Figure 2. Scores on the MFQ, from 132,000 responses (Haidt, 2012) 
The results show consistency and have been corroborated through other analyses, including: 
parsing sermons from Unitarian (liberal) and Southern Baptist (conservative) churches for their 
usage of words associated with the different foundations (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009), and 
examining the brainwaves of liberal and conservative students after being exposed to two versions 
of a statement, with one endorsing an idea consistent with a particular foundation and the other 
rejecting it (Graham, 2010). Liberal brains showed a greater level of surprise, relative to 
conservative brains when confronted with sentences that rejected Care and Fairness concerns. This 
result provides strong supporting evidence for the notion that intuitions come first and reasoning 
second, as the reactions to these statements detected in the partisan participant’s brainwaves 
registered within the first half-second, virtually immediately, implying that from this moment, the 
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reasoning process for each is starting from a different point, with a filter in place prior to any kind 
of conscious cognitive operation, leading the partisan to search for different kinds of evidence and 
reach different conclusions.  
Once the Liberty/oppression foundation was added into the questionnaire and fairness was 
reframed as relating to proportionality rather than equality, it became clear that conservatives and 
liberals were both using this foundation, albeit, with it forming a greater component of liberals’ 
moral matrix than that of conservatives. It also became clear that once fairness was reframed with 
a focus on proportionality, it became a less central component of liberals’ moral matrix while it 
stayed consistently important to conservatives. Upon reanalysing the responses to the MFQ 
questionnaire with these alterations, Haidt developed the following representations (Figure 3 of 
the moral matrices of liberals and social conservatives relating to the six moral foundations. 
 
Figure 3. The moral matrix of US liberals 
 
Figure 4. The moral matrix of US social conservatives 
42 
 
The Libertarian Moral Matrix 
A common political ideological manifestation across the world is that of libertarianism, with the 
International Alliance of Libertarian Parties (IALP) representing 21 libertarian parties across six 
continents (IALP, 2018). With a strong focus on individual liberty and laissez-faire capitalism, 
while sceptical of authority and state power, this ideology does not neatly fit within the liberal or 
conservative delineations primarily analysed by Haidt. Due to the global manifestation of this 
ideology however, it is perhaps worth noting how it relates to Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory. 
Haidt surveyed 12,000 libertarians and compared their results against those of liberals and 
conservatives and concluded that in many respects they are similarly morally constituted to liberals, 
with two significant differences: they score very low on the care foundation, even lower than 
conservatives, and much higher on the liberty foundation, even higher than conservatives. 
 
Figure 5. The moral matrix of US libertarians 
As with liberals, libertarians score very low on the loyalty, authority and sanctity foundations, 
implying they have a similarly narrow moral palate, although even narrower due to the almost non-
existence of the care foundation.  
These moral matrices offer a blueprint for understanding the key factors that bind people with 
similar political ideology together, providing a basis for those from across the political spectrum to 
better empathise with those on other parts of the spectrum. Haidt asserts that this is a central aim 
of his work, to facilitate a greater level of civility between those with differing political ideologies, 
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as without the comprehension of these moral foundations, the binding together of those with the 
same moral matrix blinds them to the coherence, or even existence of other matrices (Haidt, 2012).  
4.2.4. Morality Binds and Blinds 
Haidt uses the writings of two prominent intellectuals of philosophy and sociology, John Stuart 
Mill and Emile Durkheim respectively to exemplify the differences in how liberals and 
conservatives would conceive of how to approach the challenge of creating a society in which 
unrelated people can live together peacefully. The Millian society relies solely on the care and harm 
foundations, whereby “all individuals are equal, left as free as possible to move, develop talents 
and form relationships as they please” (Haidt, 2012, p. 191), and wherein “the only purpose that 
power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is 
to prevent harm to others” (Mill, (2003 [1859]). This society would be a “peaceful, open, and 
creative place where diverse individuals respect each other’s rights and band together voluntarily 
to help those in need or to change the laws for the common good” (Haidt, 2012, p. 191). Conversely, 
the Durkheimian society would exist “not as an agreement among individuals, but as something 
that emerged organically over time as people found ways of living together, binding themselves to 
each other, suppressing each other’s selfishness, and punishing the deviants and free-riders who 
eternally threaten to undermine cooperative groups. The basic social unit is not the individual, it is 
the hierarchically structured family, which serves as a model for other institutions. Individuals in 
such societies are born into strong and constraining relationships that profoundly limit their 
autonomy” (Haidt, 2012, p. 192). In this society, norms would be held sacred, as anomie is to be 
avoided at all cost, and it would value “self-control over self-expression, duty over rights, and 
loyalty to one’s group over concerns for out-groups” (Haidt, 2012, p. 192) 
Haidt argues that the Durkheimian vision of society is careful to maintain ‘moral capital’; the 
resources that maintain a moral community, or more specifically “the degree to which a community 
possesses interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, and 
technologies that mesh well with evolved psychological mechanisms and thereby enable the 
community to suppress or regulate selfishness and make cooperation possible” (Haidt, 2012, p. 
341). It is liberals’ narrow focus on care, fairness and liberty, Haidt asserts, that makes them more 
likely to inadvertently erode this moral capital and create the conditions for anomie. Examples 
provided include: the tendency for increased ethnic heterogeneity to increase anomie or social 
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isolation within neighbourhoods (Meer & Tolsma, 2014; Putnam, 2008), giving the right of 
students to sue their teacher and schools in the 1970s eroding authority and moral capital in schools 
(Arum, 2003), and multicultural education programs in the USA in the 1980s that emphasised 
differences among Americans, when emphasising differences tends to make people more racist, 
not less (Stenner, 2005). Haidt highlights this tendency of the left to overlook the importance of 
moral capital and the potential for it to be degraded as the left’s fundamental blind spot, while 
acknowledging that conservatives’ failure to notice certain classes of victims, to limit the predations 
of powerful interests and to see the need to update institutions over time.  
The liberal and conservative moral matrices identified by Haidt that lead to the manifestation of 
the idealised Millian and Durkheimian societies are the forces that bind these groups together, but 
they are also responsible for leaving those within them unable to see the coherence or validity of 
the moral matrix of others. It follows from this, that an understanding of the composition of these 
moral matrices provides a path towards greater efficacy in targeting those across the political 
spectrum with political campaigns and effective messaging. 
 
4.3. Drew Westen 
The dispassionate vision of the mind that predominates the design of many liberal political 
campaigns is argued by Drew Westen, a prominent clinical psychologist and political strategist, to 
be an illusion, with no bearing on how the mind actually works. His book, The Political Brain 
(2008), seeks to outline with the use of his own findings and those from the latest psychological 
literature on the interface of politics and the workings of the brain, that the segments of the brain 
that process emotional stimuli are far more important in how individuals respond to politically 
natured inputs than those involved in reasoning. Westen argues that rather than weighing evidence 
and reaching conclusions that make the most sense of the data provided, people react to emotional 
commitments that are activated by effective messaging.  
4.3.1. The Passionate Brain 
The notion of “bounded rationality”, originating from the field of economics, but also found in the 
fields of cognitive science, psychology, business, and political science, is a response to the neo-
classical economics concept of homo oeconomicus that asserts that humans make decisions purely 
45 
 
based on a ‘rational’ pursuit of self-interest after considering all relevant information. Bounded 
rationality concedes that humans are not perfectly rational, rather they use heuristics to deal with 
the excessive amount of information that cannot realistically be processed for decision-making, 
however, at its core is the axiom that rationality remains central to any decision-making process. 
Westen argues that an increasingly substantial body of evidence from psychology and neuroscience 
studies shows that this is not the case, and that rather than appealing to the “boundedly rational” 
individual, he urges liberals to consider the role of emotion in the design of political campaigns. 
Westen highlights the work of Charles Darwin, B. F. Skinner, and Sigmund Freud to support his 
claim against homo oeconomicus and bounded rationality and demonstrate the dominant role of 
emotion in how the brain processes politically related stimuli.  
Darwin claimed that emotions serve an adaptive function, in that, animals will signal their readiness 
to fight, run, or attend to each other’s needs through a variety of postural, facial, and other nonverbal 
communications. For example, the baring of teeth signifies an aggressive posture while a baby’s 
cry signals distress to its parents. This ability to send and receive emotional signals regulates social 
behaviour and increases an individual’s chances of survival (Westen, 2008, p. 70) and there is an 
extensive scientific literature demonstrating that emotion is one of the most potent drivers of human 
behaviour (Izard, 1997; Lang, 1995; Plutchik, 1980; Plutchik, 2003; Tomkins, 1962). Westen also 
highlights that natural selection favours reciprocal altruism and consequently, the emotions that 
have evolved over millions of years to enable such altruism.  
B. F. Skinner’s primary contribution towards a passionate vision of the mind is his addition to 
Darwin’s theory of natural selection that behaviour also faces these forces, through the two primary 
mechanisms of reinforcement and punishment. He showed that these are the primary mechanisms 
through which organisms learn to adapt to their environment, providing an evolutionary advantage. 
These mechanisms work in the manner that they do however, because these reinforcing and 
punishing experiences elicit positive and negative feelings and emotions, and these are associated 
with two neural systems called the behavioural approach and behavioural inhibition system 
respectively (Gray 1987; Gray 2000). The behavioural approach system generates pleasurable 
emotional states, leading animals to approach stimuli associated with them, whereas the 
behavioural inhibition system generates anxiety which leads to avoidance of such stimuli. These 
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systems correspond with different neural circuitry as well as with the use of different 
neurotransmitters (dopamine vs norepinephrine).  
One of Sigmund Freud’s contributions to our understanding of the human mind is his development 
of instinct theory. Freud proposed sex and aggression to be the two central instincts that motivate 
human behaviour and that these are regulated by the cerebral cortex, which when it is damaged or 
removed, tends to manifest highly aggressive and brutal behaviours, particularly in men. While the 
centrality of these instincts to human behaviour is disputed, it has led to the development of a more 
nuanced model of human motivation that proposes wishes, fears, and values as the factors that 
“drive” people (Westen, 1985; Westen 1994), and emotion is central to all three. Wishes are the 
human mind manifesting a mental representation of a desired situation associated with a positive 
emotional state, while fears are the mind manifesting a negative situation associated with a negative 
emotional state. Values are “emotion-laden beliefs about how things should or should not be—
morally, interpersonally, or aesthetically” (Westen, 2008), p. 82), and while values are primarily 
viewed as cultural manifestations, cross-cultural value-based motivations that are connected to 
biological proclivities do exist such as rejections of incest or the prioritisation by individuals of 
family members over those not in one’s family.  
Perhaps Freud’s greatest contribution to an understanding of the passionate mind is the description 
of emotion-laden neural networks in the brain that contributes to much of our behaviour; interlinked 
networks of associated thoughts, memories, images, sounds, smells, and feelings. A crucial 
distinction by Freud was that these networks could be activated below the level of our 
consciousness, and this finding has been corroborated by modern neurological research (Westen, 
1998). Cognitive neuroscientists have been able to demonstrate the efficacy of priming a subject 
with words activating one part of a network in activating the rest of network, for example: priming 
with the word dog, led to subjects being able to identify the correct spelling of the words terrier 
and collie more quickly than without priming, and priming with the words ocean and moon made 
participants more likely to name the Tide brand of laundry detergent than others (Nesbitt & Wilson, 
1977), as ocean and moon are part of a network of associations that includes tide. The expression 
a “Freudian slip” refers to the situation where a person means to say one thing but says another that 
exists within an associated network that is active below the level of consciousness. Given the nature 
of these interlinked networks of associations, Westen argues that the creating, solidifying, and 
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activating of networks that primarily create positive feelings toward a party or party’s candidate 
should be a central aim of political parties, and that Republicans in the USA have focused 
tremendous resources towards this end for decades and have been highly successful. The 
Democratic party and US liberals, he argues, have been successfully associated with high taxes, 
reckless government expenditure, military weakness and questionable morals by Republicans. 
Further evidence for the passionate vision of the mind can be derived from an examination of the 
role of the brain’s amygdala—an area of the brain involved in emotional processes like identifying 
emotional responses in others or attaching emotional significance to events—in detecting 
subliminal stimuli. Westen and his colleague Joel Weinberger conducted research whereby 
individuals were shown pictures of politicians’ faces while the word RATS was flashed on the 
screen for a consciously indistinguishable period of time (Weinberger & Westen, 2008), with a 
control group shown STAR; RATS spelled backwards. This was an attempt to discern whether 
there could have been a meaningful affect achieved by a TV attack ad against Al Gore run by the 
Republican National Committee in 2000 for George W. Bush that similarly featured—whether 
unintentionally as claimed, or intentionally—a subliminal flashing of RATS on the screen. In 
Westen and Weinberger’s study, a clear negative effect was seen on the perception of politicians 
that were shown with the subliminal RATS message. While intentional subliminal messaging in 
political campaigns is ethically dubious at best, there are other methods that utilise more blatant 
stimuli that can become functionally subliminal if an individual is not devoting direct attention to 
it. For example, repeated slogans on a screen behind a talking politician or the choice of music or 
sound effects in a political ad are technically not subliminal but can be unintendedly overlooked 
and become implicit, all the while eliciting a significant subconscious effect through stimulation of 
the amygdala (Brader, 2006). 
An additional demonstration of the passionate brain in action within a political context, is Westen’s 
findings that individuals shown conflicting statements by favoured politicians were not only 
observed to have activated neural networks indicating distress, but that they reasoned to a false 
conclusion and in doing so, these networks were switched off and circuits involved in positive 
emotions were turned on (Westen et al, 2006). This study is demonstrating the occurrence of two 
well established and closely linked phenomena—cognitive dissonance and motivated reasoning—
within the realm of political ideation and sense-making. Cognitive dissonance can be described as 
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a type of psychological stress that occurs when an individual is confronted with information that 
contradicts a deeply held belief. This emotional state is precisely the kind of stimulus that leads an 
individual to engage in motivated reasoning; the tendency to reason towards pre-conceived ideas, 
attitudes, and beliefs (Kunda, 1990). The neural networks indicating distress in this study are 
capturing the neural mechanism conveying cognitive dissonance, and the false conclusion arrived 
at coinciding with activation of neural networks associated with the creation of positive emotions 
illuminates the neurological actuation of the motivated reasoning process. Another demonstration 
of this kind of motivated reasoning incited by emotional factors is found in Westen’s survey of 
individuals asking about the motivations of an accuser that alleged sexual harassment claims 
against Bill Clinton. The study found cognitive constraints—the level of knowledge about both 
Clinton’s history and the scandal itself—had minimal impact on people’s judgement, whereas 
emotional constraints—feelings about the Democratic and Republican party and feelings toward 
Clinton—each strongly predicted their beliefs about the scandal (Westen et al, 2005). The 
neurological response to cognitive dissonance in a political context, and the significance of 
emotional constraints shown in these two studies gives further credence to the primacy of emotion 
in political ideation and sense-making. 
4.3.2. Availing the Passionate Brain 
After making a case for discarding the vision of a primarily rational, dispassionate political brain, 
Westen uses the evidence he provides for the alternative, passionate vision of the brain to provide 
concrete prescriptions for liberal political parties and their politicians to run more effective 
campaigns.  
The choice of candidate must be determined not just on their knowledge of policy or political nous, 
but on a slew of factors relating to their impact on the public’s perceptions and emotional responses 
to them. Too often the focus on how well a candidate can navigate the political landscape to secure 
the necessary party support and explain details of key policies outweighs how well they can engage 
with emotional aspects of a campaign or whether they possess personal traits that engender trust 
and other positive emotions in the public. Resistance to the use of emotion in political campaigns 
can originate from numerous sources, including relying on facts and figures to portray a belief in 
moral superiority, a belief that utilising an appeal to emotional responses is somehow manipulative, 
or an inherent discomfort in displaying or appealing to emotion (e.g. obsessional personality style, 
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emotional avoidance) that exists in many highly cognitive individuals that perceive themselves to 
rather be highly logical and rational (Westen, 2008). Ample evidence exists that shows voters’ 
feelings towards a party and/or candidate has a strong influence on their choice in an election, that 
these feelings can be swayed one way or another and that when these feelings are in contradiction 
with more considered assessments of strengths and weakness that feelings tend to trump beliefs 
(Campbell et al, 1964; Abelson et al, 1982; Lavine et al, 1998; Marcus, 1988; Marcus et al, 2000; 
Granberg & Brown, 1989). 
With this in mind, Westen prescribes four goals for any political campaign: 
1. Transcending any specific candidate, to define the party and its principles in a way that’s 
emotionally compelling and tells a coherent story of what its members believe in, and to 
define the other party and its values in a way that undermines its capacity to resonate with 
voters 
2. Maximise positive and minimise negative feelings about a candidate and to encourage the 
opposite set of feelings about the opposition candidate 
3. Manage feelings towards a candidate’s personal characteristics in order that they appear 
trustworthy, competent, empathic, and capable of strong leadership 
4. Manage positive and negative feelings towards a candidate’s/party’s policies and positions 
(Westen, 2008, p. 137) 
Based on the weight of evidence and the corresponding relative weights associated with each 
prescription discerned from the studies covered, Westen argues that these goals be prioritised in 
the order listed above. For instance, responding to an attempt at character assassination from an 
opposition candidate or party by focusing on policy can be potentially catastrophic to a political 
campaign (Westen, 2008). Finding the right rhetoric is key to executing these priorities and Westen 
uses Reagan’s potent rhetoric in the 1984 presidential election to demonstrate how Republicans 
have historically been able to master this effort to great effect. Taxation was deemed “confiscation”, 
attempts to solve social problems were “costly social experiments” and regulation of market 
failures became “economic tinkering”, creating an image of the Democrats as bumbling, ineffectual 
and intrusive in the lives of individuals (Westen, 2008, p. 154). Another key, related technique for 
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actualising these goals is with the use of metaphor and analogy. In the same 1984 presidential 
campaign, Reagan and the Republicans referred to “Morning in America” creating the metaphor 
that under Reagan, the USA had entered a new day, evoking positive feelings of the Republicans 
and Reagan as returning the country to prosperous times of a bygone era and creating an implicit 
contrast with the “dark days” under the previous Democratic administration. Reagan’s use of the 
term “freedom fighters” when referring to Nicaraguan death squads completely altered the context 
in which these soldiers were seen and shifted the terms of discourse for the media and other 
politicians (Holyoak & Thagard, 1989), and George H. Bush used the analogy of Hitler to describe 
Saddam Hussein, rather than to compare the potential for a protracted insurgency and guerrilla 
conflict in Iraq with the US’s experience in Vietnam, which framed the conflict in a more urgent 
and morally imperative fashion, softening public opinion for the forthcoming Gulf War. 
Stimulating and managing these kinds of emotional associations that positively contribute to 
people’s perception of a candidate or campaign are critical to electoral success according to 
Westen, and in this vein, he proposes four principles designed to guide the construction of 
persuasive political appeals (Westen, 2008, p. 257-275): 
• If You Don’t Feel it, Don’t Use it 
Every piece of political communication should be intended to elicit a specific emotion, so 
the design of it should consider this first and foremost and must describe the associated 
values and principles with emotional clarity.  
• Frame Messages for Emotional Impact 
Republicans in the USA have successfully focused on the framing of key issues and 
pieces of legislation for a number of decades and provide evidence of effectiveness, as 
many of these frames have then been used by both sides of politics. Some examples: tax 
cuts were translated into tax relief, legislation to reduce regulation on polluting companies 
was called the “Clear Skies Act”, legislation to allow logging in national forests was 
called the “Healthy Forests Restoration Act”, and the estate tax was turned into the death 
tax. Generic or conventional language to refer to important areas of policy should be 
avoided at all cost and formulations that have the potential to evoke an emotional 
response should be prioritised. 
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• Pitch Messages at the Right Level 
Focusing on communicating values or ideological principles at the “basic level”—that is, 
categories to which our minds generally gravitate, wherein objects share many features in 
common, features which help distinguish them from other objects (e.g. dinner, car, 
bird)—is what Westen calls a principled stand. Whereas either including a high level of 
detail or abstracting at too high a level tends to leave individuals either confused, or at 
least emotionally unengaged, a principled stand resonates emotionally with individuals 
while conveying the appropriate level of detail. Some examples are: “If I wouldn’t send 
my child to war, I won’t send yours”, “My opponent likes to call maintaining a low 
federal minimum wage “business friendly”, we call it corporate welfare paid for by low-
income workers”. 
• Appeal to the Whole Brain 
Use as many sensory inputs as possible to activate as many neural networks as possible. 
Evocative imagery, visual effects, music, sound effects, and wording should be used 
together whenever possible to activate emotional associations and ensure the messaging is 
as memorable and resonant as possible. Care should be taken to ensure that this is done in 
a way that aims at evoking an intended emotional response, and that it isn’t inadvertently 
working in the favour of opposition. 
The prescriptions proffered by Westen go against much of liberal conventional wisdom, which 
tends to deify the appeal to individuals’ reason and logical evaluation of political messaging. The 
use of contemporary studies on the role of emotional centres of the brain provides strong evidence 
that the role of emotion in influencing people’s perception of politicians and political campaigns is 
profound. These findings create a passionate vision of the mind, that is swayed first by unconscious 
responses to emotional stimuli with reason playing a post-hoc role to justify these emotional 
responses. 
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5. Synthesis 
By considering the insights of the three authors covered by this thesis on the topic of political sense-
making it is possible to bring together relevant elements of their analyses to both reinforce 
overlapping findings and provide the basis for a deeper critique on the current plight of left-wing 
politics in the USA. The relative primacy of morality, emotion, and reason in the political sense-
making process will be discussed, and the impact that the modernity induced process of 
individualisation has had on both sides of politics will be addressed.  
5.1. Morality, Emotion, Reason 
In the age of early Greek philosophers, preeminent thinkers like Plato and Socrates were convinced 
that reason played a dominant role in human nature; that it was perfectible and that by controlling 
our passions we could harness it to guide us towards a virtuous existence (Plato, 1943). This 
perspective asserts that the function of moral reasoning is to help us discover truth and to assist us 
in knowing how to live a righteous life and who to condemn when they misbehave. It is this kind 
of thinking that motivates many politicians on the left to rely on the purveyance of facts, figures, 
policy outlines and lists of policy priorities to convince individuals of the merits of voting for them. 
The notion that people just need more information to decide how to vote and that when considering 
how to reach voters they need to find ways to maximise factual content of political communications 
is widespread amongst liberal political parties and campaigns. This deification of objective, 
conscious reasoning in the pursuit of truth flies in the face of a large body of evidence that shows 
that people are affected heavily by subconscious mechanisms that corrupt such reasoning (Bersoff, 
1999; Ditto, Munro, Apanovitch, Scepansky, & Lockhart, 2003; Ditto et al., 2009; Kunda, 1990; 
Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Nickerson, 1998; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1999). The “treacherous 
trio” of confirmation bias, cognitive dissonance and motivated reasoning are well understood 
psychological phenomena which actively, but subconsciously, work to distort the process of 
objective reasoning. The domain of political sense-making is no exception to this rule, and as 
cognitive dissonance occurs most prevalently when incoming information conflicts with an element 
closely related to one’s core identity—as many political beliefs can be—it may be particularly 
vulnerable to this form of cognitive distortion. 
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All three authors (Lakoff, Haidt, Westen) refute this notion of a dispassionate and objective mind 
reasoning towards political conclusions absent the influence of cognitive biases, and provide 
differing modes of evidence to support their assertions that reason plays a much smaller role in 
political sense-making than is suggested by the approaches chosen in many political campaigns 
conducted by liberal parties and candidates in the US in recent years. Jonathan Haidt spends a 
significant portion of his book The Righteous Mind outlining the first principle of moral 
psychology; that moral intuitions come first, and strategic reasoning second. He and Drew Westen 
both evoke Freud’s metaphor of a rider (ego) haplessly attempting to control a horse (id) but update 
it to represent the relation of mental reasoning and its inability to fully affect the direction of 
automatically generated intuitions. Haidt provides much evidence to show how our brains evaluate 
instantly and constantly (Wundt, 1907; Zajonc, 1968), and how social and political judgements 
depend heavily on quick intuitive flashes (Todorov et al, 2005; Greenwald et al, 2003). This 
evidence is then corroborated by the studies conducted by Drew Westen and his colleagues showing 
that emotional areas of the brain are instantaneously activated when individuals are asked to reason 
about political information either confirming or contradicting previously established beliefs 
(Westen et al, 2005; Westen et al, 2006).  
A clear demonstration of the post-hoc nature of moral reasoning is provided by Haidt’s study 
showing people morally dumbfounded after attempting to generate moral argumentation against 
hypothetical scenarios, only for those arguments to be contradicted by interviewers showing these 
concerns were not represented in the hypothetical scenario (Haidt et al., 1993). Interviewees, after 
discovering their moral arguments were irrelevant to the scenario, did not change their perspective, 
but rather stuck with their original ‘moral intuition’, absent any rational justification. Haidt uses 
the analogy of a press secretary that is tasked with justifying the policy positions of their political 
boss without control over these same policy positions, to demonstrate the relationship between 
moral intuitions and the post-hoc rationalisation of them. 
The initial emotional response to inputs of a political nature demonstrated by Westen and his 
colleagues show the interface between morality and emotions and by bringing together the analyses 
of Westen and Haidt, we begin to see how tightly linked they are in the processing of political 
stimuli. The neuroimaging studies conducted by Westen et al (2005,2006) highlight the emotional 
centres of the brain as immediately activated by partisan stimuli, but these are the same areas of 
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the brain that have been shown to deal with moral judgements. Haidt presents the findings of studies 
of individuals subjected to functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scans while ordered to 
navigate moral dilemmas, process moral violations, make charitable donations, assign punishments 
for crimes, or play games with cheaters or co-operators (Greene et al, 2001; Rilling et al, 2008; 
Sanfey et al, 2003). In all these cases, the parts of the brain known to be involved in emotional 
processing were all activated immediately in response to these situations. What the automatic 
emotional responses to the politically oriented, partisan stimuli shows, is a physiological 
manifestation of moralistic predetermined positions existent within the subconscious mind of the 
individual. These responses are triggered by a fundamental layer of moralistic mental architecture: 
a moral matrix that consists of delineable components that exist within each person’s mind.  
Jonathan Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory is his attempt to give structure to this architecture and 
to propose a clear, measurable delineation of these moral components between liberals and 
conservatives. The six moral foundations (care, fairness, liberty, loyalty, authority, sanctity) are 
proposed to have evolved in response to common adaptive challenges faced by our ancestors from 
many thousands of years ago, and to materialise in specific manifestations across the political 
spectrum according to a combination of genetic predisposition and life experiences. Liberals are 
shown to have a strong expression of the care, fairness, and liberty foundations, with the care 
foundation having the strongest moral bearing on liberal individuals out of all the foundations, 
while the authority, loyalty and sanctity foundations are found to be almost completely absent from 
the moral matrix of liberals. The care foundation has a significantly lower expression amongst 
conservatives, who show a relatively even but significant manifestation of all six foundations, 
whereas libertarians are shown to have virtually no expression of the care, loyalty, authority, or 
sanctity foundations and a moderate expression of the fairness foundation, while the liberty 
foundation has an extremely strong bearing on their moral matrix. These moral configurations 
provide a deep insight into the triggers of emotional responses such as those discussed above; the 
more a moral foundation is present in one’s moral matrix, the greater the potential there is for the 
emotional centres in the brain to respond in kind and the implications of this for political strategists 
are profound. Westen claims that political decision making is a rationalisation for individuals’ 
emotional preferences and prejudices (Westen, 2008, p. 97), however this neglects to address the 
deeper causal mechanism behind these emotional preferences and prejudices, which—based on an 
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understanding of Moral Foundation Theory—can be interpreted as stemming from the composition 
of one’s moral matrix. 
Another interpretation of the role of morality in political sense-making is George Lakoff’s 
description of the central conceptual metaphors of the Nation-as-Family, Strict Father and 
Nurturant Family. Lakoff argues that “it is the common, unconscious, and automatic metaphor of 
the Nation-as-Family that produces contemporary conservatism from Strict Father morality and 
contemporary liberalism from Nurturant Parent morality” (Lakoff, 1996, p. 13), and contained 
within these two family-based moral matrices are a number of moral metaphors that are unique to 
each model. Lakoff asserts that much of moral reasoning is metaphorical in nature, and that in the 
political context, these conceptual metaphors and the moral priorities contained within them are 
central to understanding how liberals and conservatives come to hold the clusters of policy 
positions that they do. The unconscious nature of these conceptual metaphors implies that the moral 
reasoning that is associated with them stems from this subconscious mental architecture, not from 
some conscious, cognitive, and objective interpretation of incoming information. This 
interpretation of the mental processes at work bears significant similarities to Haidt’s description 
of the unconscious moral matrices containing specific combinations of moral foundations which 
he claims forms the basis for how people engage in moral reasoning. Both accounts of the origins 
of moral reasoning claim that delineable moral components that can be isolated and specified for 
individuals at either ends of the political spectrum, exist, and are the critical driving force behind 
generating moral conclusions with predictable political manifestations. There is considerable 
overlap in these specified moral components between the two theories and these will be explored 
below. The analysis by Westen shows that when these moral components are engaged by political 
considerations that relate to them, there is a measurable physiological reaction in the emotional 
centres of the brain, and that these reactions are predictable and must be understood in order to run 
an effective political campaign. 
The prevailing inference from these analyses with regards to the relative primacy of morality, 
emotion, and reason, is that reason should not be afforded its place as the critical determiner of an 
individual’s political perspective. What underlies the political sense-making process is a 
subconscious moral architecture that varies across the political spectrum and dictates how incoming 
information of a political nature is processed. Once received and percolated through this moral 
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architecture, it generates an instantaneous emotional response that can be harnessed to motivate an 
individual in a particular political direction. The exact nature and composition of this moral 
architecture varies according to Haidt and Lakoff’s accounts, but the primacy afforded to its moral 
components that trigger and imbue the undertaking of moral reasoning and generate the emotional 
responses highlighted by Westen in the political sense-making process, is clear. If we are able to 
delineate these moral components that constitute this subconscious moral architecture, it may be 
possible to utilise them in bolstering efforts to influence an individual’s political perspective and 
ultimate decision at the ballot-box. The following section will aim to do just this, by analysing 
where the authors’ analyses converge. 
5.2. Moral Domains of Convergence 
While the methodology and theoretical foundations behind Lakoff and Haidt’s findings relating to 
what is behind people’s political worldview differ substantially, a critical similarity between the 
two is the fundamental role that morality is found to play. While Haidt’s Moral Foundation Theory 
was not derived for the express purpose of understanding the political particularisation of specific 
moral constituents, the liberal/conservative/libertarian distinction proved to yield distinct moral 
compositions that have proven highly stable across a large sample of the United States population. 
Lakoff’s Strict Father and Nurturant Parent models rely on a number of metaphors for morality that 
constitute the moral fibre of two well established models of the family. The list of moral metaphors 
derived by Lakoff that is inherent to the two models of the family aligns strikingly well with Haidt’s 
moral foundations providing a compelling reason to explore these similarities in some detail to see 
what can be discerned from these overlapping findings.  
Care/Nurturance/Empathy 
The care foundation described by Haidt—which his findings show is the most prominent 
foundation in the moral matrix of liberals—is closely aligned with Lakoff’s formulation of the 
morality as nurturance and morality as empathy metaphors which he asserts are the two most 
dominant moral metaphors in the nurturant parent model. Lakoff’s claim that nurturance 
presupposes empathy and that in order to nurture a child one must project one’s capacity for feeling 
onto a child accurately enough to gain a sense of what that child needs, implies that these two moral 
metaphors are closely intertwined. The gist of these moral metaphors is wholly congrous with the 
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adaptive challenge proposed by Haidt as the evolutionary catalyst for the care foundation, providing 
a relatively seamless theoretical basis to justify the existence of some conformation of this form of 
morality in the moral architecture of liberals. The relative primacy shown by both authors of the 
respective representations of this type of morality for liberals provides a compelling indication that 
it plays a critical role in the political sense-making process for individuals on this part of the 
political spectrum. 
Fairness/Liberty/Fair Distribution 
The notion of fairness is not a straightforward one, with its many iterations a function of the broad 
moral spectrum found across and within countries around the world. Accordingly, it is represented 
differently in Haidt and Lakoff’s characterisations of the moral architecture of conservatives and 
liberals in the USA. While Haidt initially proposed that the fairness moral foundation was primarily 
related to notions of equality, he soon realised that this was primarily only capturing one type of 
liberal interpretation of fairness, whereas conservatives also cared much about fairness, but rather 
a proportionality related interpretation of it (Haidt, 2012, p. 196). This led to the derivation of the 
liberty foundation, as Haidt claims that the liberal, equality-related interpretation of fairness is more 
closely related to the psychology of liberty and oppression rather than reciprocity and exchange. 
Once this foundation was added and the fairness foundation was amended to reflect notions of 
proportionality rather than equality, it became clear that while liberals and conservatives tended to 
care equally about this interpretation of fairness, the liberty foundation was more prominently 
represented in the moral matrix of liberals than of conservatives. 
Lakoff claims that morality as fair distribution is a “cornerstone of Nurturant Parent morality” 
(1996, p. 124), and lists ten different models of fair distribution, which is an attempt to underscore 
the complex nature of this moral domain. He specifies four distinctive variations of equality-based 
fairness (equality of distribution, equality of opportunity, equal distribution of responsibility, equal 
distribution of power), while the proportionality-based variation is labelled scalar distribution. As 
Lakoff doesn’t allude to notions of fairness in his Strict Father model, whereas Haidt has 
empirically found that proportionality is an important element within the moral matrix of 
conservatives, it appears that Lakoff may be underestimating its relevance for the conservative 
political worldview. With this said, the Strict Father model’s strong emphasis on discipline in the 
context of a competitive world leading to a moralistic notion of wealth and success heavily implies 
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that proportionality is desirable, lest “lazy”, “immoral” people are awarded with unearned benefits. 
The amendment of Haidt’s fairness foundation after detecting a conservative affinity towards a 
proportionality-related notion of fairness also includes, implicitly, a moralistic endorsement of 
competition dictating the relative fortunes of individuals in a society. 
Authority/Order 
Both Haidt and Lakoff identify the primacy of the concept of authority within the conservative 
worldview, with Haidt deriving it from the adaptive challenge of forging relationships that will 
benefit an individual within social hierarchies, whereas Lakoff asserts that it is patterned 
metaphorically on parental authority. Haidt’s derivation of the authority moral foundation also 
draws on the natural authority and mutual expectations of the parent child relationship, whereby 
perceptions of legitimate authority are accompanied by an expectation of responsibility for those 
under such authority. The conservative affinity and moralistic legitimisation for notions of 
authority is highly consequential in the realm of politics, as not only can conservative leaders utilise 
this for energising potential voters, but it is possible to justify the consolidation of executive powers 
under the guise of a strong, but legitimate use of this political authority. Embedded in this perceived 
legitimacy of authority within the conservative moral architecture is an implicit endorsement for 
hierarchy. This is also demonstrated by Lakoff’s assertion that the concept of moral order is 
entrenched within the political worldview of conservatives. Lakoff asserts that it originates from a 
folk theory of the natural order whereby God has moral authority over people, people over nature, 
adults over children, and men over women. The existence of this metaphor of moral order has 
profound implications for legitimating certain existing power relations as being natural and 
therefore moral. For example, the feminist and environmental conservation movements can easily 
be framed as unnatural for pushing for gender equality and a view of nature having an inherent 
value. Lakoff’s notion of the moral order and its embedded conceptualisations of moral authority 
is a further demonstration of the inherent affinity conservatives hold for perceived legitimate forms 
of authority.  
Sanctity/Purity/Wholeness 
Haidt claims that due to the omnivore’s dilemma and living in a world full of pathogens and 
parasites, humans developed a moral sense of sanctity towards many objects and values in response 
to these adaptive challenges. This tendency is claimed by Haidt to stem from the evolved sense of 
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disgust that humans experience towards things that are potentially harmful, like faeces, rotting 
flesh, and diseased animals and individuals, however as our omnivore ancestors were constantly 
needing to balance the expression of neophilia (attraction to new things and experiences) and 
neophobia (aversion to new things and experiences) to optimise food intake and maximise 
longevity, the spectrum of how these tendencies manifests is broad. Haidt proposes that those that 
have a stronger expression of neophilia tend to be predisposed to a smaller representation of the 
sanctity foundation and this helps to explain why it is not prominent within the moral matrix of 
liberals. Haidt’s sanctity moral foundation overlaps significantly with Lakoff’s metaphor of moral 
purity, with both proposed as core parts of the conservative moral architecture. Lakoff uses 
linguistic examples to show how conceptions of immorality are expressed as “disgusting”, “dirty”, 
or “filthy”, whereas moral actions or behaviour is expressed as “pure”, or “clean”. The moral 
wholeness metaphor conceived by Lakoff and asserted to be closely linked with the moral purity 
metaphor also relates to Haidt’s sanctity moral foundation as it intimates that moral standards must 
remain fixed over time; that any change in morality in the name of moral progress is an evil force 
attempting to undermine the moral foundations of society and tear the social fabric apart. This is 
very much in line with the neophobic origins of Haidt’s sanctity moral foundation, as perceiving 
moral standards as fixed and immovable is a manifestation of a sanctified moral code.  
 
5.3. Individualisation and its Political Manifestation 
The shift from the cultural state of modernity to what Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens refer to 
as ‘reflexive modernity’—the stage of modernity within which the key social institutions and 
principles are being transformed so as to be unrecognisable from those which formerly were stably 
extant (Beck, Bonss, & Lau, 2003)—has roughly coincided with the rise of neoliberalism into its 
ideological hegemony. The neoliberal fetishisation of markets and accompanying deification of the 
individual as the basic social unit and lens through which to analyse our economic systems has 
likely made a significant contribution to the individualisation of the societies of western nations, 
although ostensibly alongside an overarching structural change in these societies that is arguably 
more pervasive—what Beck labels institutionalised individualisation (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 
2002). In this age of reflexive modernity, Beck argues that “human mutuality and community rest 
no longer on solidly established traditions, but, rather, on a paradoxical collectivity of reciprocal 
individualisation” (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002, preface). Individualisation is specified as an 
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intentionally ambivalent term, as it is proposed to be nonlinear, open-ended, and undecided; 
simultaneously a structural phenomenon and occurring at the level of the individual whereby it is 
internalised and leads to the destruction of all standard social foundations (Mills, 2007). The central 
premise of this concept, however, is the transformation of the determination of human identity and 
an individual’s consequent social standing from a ‘given’ to a ‘task’, with individuals possessing 
the agency of performing this task, having previously been essentially born into their identity (Beck 
& Beck-Gernsheim, 2002, foreword). An individual’s lifestyle is no longer set by pre-existing 
patterns and habits, it is consigned to obligatory self-determination, and these lifestyle choices are 
no longer cursory elements of one’s life, rather they constitute a reflexive narrative of ‘self’ and 
serve to define an individual (Giddens, 1993).  
This individualisation process that has been unfolding over recent decades has inevitable political 
implications, as it concurrently moulds the values and morals relating to an individual’s perception 
of their place in society and of the nature of their relationship with others. The increased impetus 
toward self-determination, self-sufficiency, and self-actualisation has led to individuals feeling 
both responsible for and empowered to deal with broad, complex issues like environmental 
degradation; accepting the paradigm that personal lifestyle changes en masse can provide a solution 
in lieu of addressing deep structural failures or misaligned incentives. This feeling of empowerment 
is often however accompanied by feelings of confusion, ambivalence or uncertainty caused by the 
sense of individual responsibility (Connolly & Prothero, 2008). In all probability, the effects of 
individualisation do not manifest uniformly in individuals across the political spectrum. As Haidt 
has indicated with his liberty moral foundation, liberals tend to exhibit this tenet of morality within 
their moral matrices to a greater extent than conservatives, and the notions of individual freedoms 
and freedom of expression are critical ingredients in catalysing the individualisation process. 
Haidt’s demonstration that the basic social unit of conservatives is the family, versus the individual 
for liberals, provides a potential insight into the relative resilience of each side of the political 
spectrum against this social phenomenon. The primacy of tradition, and the importance of 
maintaining social norms and moral standards are all central tenets of conservative ideology and 
are all compatible with the constant promotion of immutable “family values” demonstrated by 
conservative political parties. All these traits act as counterweights to the increasing pervasiveness 
of notions of self-determination, self-sufficiency and self-actualisation that are hallmarks of the 
individualisation process. Conservative ideals of sacrifice, duty, and loyalty highlighted by Haidt 
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and Lakoff also act in opposition to these traits, which serve to further demonstrate that there is a 
potential mismatch in the susceptibility of conservatives and liberals to the individualisation 
process.  
The demonstrated discrepancy in the prominence of Haidt’s liberal foundation between 
conservatives and liberals, combined with the almost non-existence of the authority, loyalty, and 
sanctity foundations amongst liberals, provides a snapshot of the liberal moral matrix and alludes 
to the current degree of influence the individualisation process has had on it. The idea that moral 
matrices are entirely stable over time and that the relative prominence of each foundation is fixed 
in individuals across the spectrum of political ideology is unrealistic. As cultural standards shift, 
and new generations are raised with these standards as a given rather than a new paradigm to 
interpret against the backdrop of previous cultural eras as is the case for current generations, the 
constitution and relative weighting of moral components within moral matrices is sure to evolve. 
This is particularly pertinent for liberals, as the conservative reverence for tradition and maintaining 
cultural norms and tendency to sanctify many moral facets may act as a bulwark against this 
process, whereas the liberal propensity towards neophilia and social evolution are likely key drivers 
of the advancement of these cultural standards. Lakoff’s use of radial categories to differentiate 
between distinct variations of liberals provides further evidence of the pliable nature of the liberal 
moral architecture. Lakoff asserts there are six types of liberals in the USA: socioeconomic, identity 
politics, environmentalist, civil liberty, spiritual, and antiauthoritarian, and that they are all captured 
within the nurturant parent model of morality.  
If the process of individualisation of society is indeed altering the moral matrices of its members, 
and disproportionately so those of liberals, the political ramifications of this are profound. A large 
body of empirical research is highlighting the evolution of social relations in modern societies 
towards more superficial, impersonal, and instrumental interactions, leading people to express their 
experiences of loneliness and longing for intimacy (Lane, 2001). Relatedly, a “Machiavellian 
syndrome” appears to be increasingly manifest in modern western societies, whereby individuals 
display a manipulative attitude towards others around them, calculating the costs and benefits of a 
relationship and ceasing it when it no longer “pays off” (Blokland, 2006). The continual pursuit of 
self-sufficiency, perceived as critical to achieving well-being, in turn leads to a greater degree of 
noncommittal and superficial relationships within society. This directly undermines one of the key 
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tenets of liberal ideology; that of communitarianism. Intimate and meaningful relations are not just 
the fundamental building blocks of human wellbeing, they are necessary to sustain strong and 
functioning communities. If the liberal fallibility against individualisation remains unchecked, it 
will become harder and harder to not only perpetuate the importance of communitarianism across 
societies, but to fulfil related goals of socialist government policy including strong social 
infrastructure and safety nets.  
One outcome that might be expected as a result of individualisation impacting on the composition 
and relative prevalence of different moral matrices is the increase in individuals identifying as 
libertarians or leaning libertarian. According to Haidt’s moral foundation theory, libertarians are 
essentially liberals with an extremely prominent liberty foundation and almost non-existent care 
foundation. The spreading Machiavellian Syndrome described by Blokland (2006), fits well within 
this narrative and the statistics in the USA show those identifying as libertarian steadily rising since 
2000 and at an all-time high of 27% of survey respondents in 2015, making them the largest single 
political affiliation group above Democrats and Republicans (see Figure 5).  
 
 
Figure 5. Trend in USA Libertarianism (Source: Gallup Governance Surveys 2000-2015) 
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The liberal moral metaphors relating to self-development and self-interest identified by Lakoff are 
likely being engaged by the individualisation-related trends towards self-determination and self-
actualisation. Lakoff has outlined his observation of a hierarchy of moral priorities namely 
nurturance-related morality (including empathy, nurturance and fair distribution), moral self-
interest, and strength-related morality, and a potential by-product of individualisation is a 
realignment of the prioritisation of moral self-interest closer to the nurturance group.  
While Beck celebrates the individualisation trajectory that western societies are on for its potential 
to “reinvigorate” the politics of these societies embracing the new paradigm of unshackled 
individualism to “forge new, politically open, creative forms of bond and alliance” (Beck, 1997), 
Zygmunt Bauman, another preeminent writer on individualisation cautions that this process may 
instead bring a weakening of communal bonds and ever greater anomie4. Haidt’s warning of the 
liberal tendency to disregard the value to society of tradition and the moral capital it engenders 
suggest that Bauman is closer to the mark (Haidt, 2012), however his assertion that conservatives 
are inherently morally constituted to sanctify these traditions and other facets of society that 
contribute to moral capital implies that perhaps they are less susceptible to the individualisation 
process.  
It is possible that individualisation has played a role in the emergent dominance of identity politics 
on the left in western societies in recent decades. Martin Luther King Jr.’s call for black and white 
people to be treated equally in the early 1960’s was usurped in the late sixties by a call from groups 
such as the Black Panthers and the Nation of Islam for recognition of their own traditions and ‘lived 
experience’. A demand for recognition of the unique lived experience and the intrinsic differences 
of each marginalised group in society has replaced a call for treatment as equals to the dominant 
group (Fukuyama, 2018). The time at which this shift commenced coincides roughly with the 
proposed genesis of Beck’s institutionalised individualisation, and the emphasis on achieving 
recognition of defining experiential and intrinsic differences correlates with a greater emphasis 
being generated towards the paramountcy of an individual’s specific identity traits that is embodied 
by the individualisation process. The tendency of the left to engage so prominently in forms of 
                                               
4 Bauman in Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, Individualization, 2002, xviii 
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identity politics around gender and race in recent years may be a symptom of the afore proposed 
greater susceptibility of liberals to the individualisation process. 
5.4. Conservative Coherence, Liberal Discordance 
The current dominance of right-wing populist politics across wealthy western nations undoubtedly 
has many roots and interrelated causal factors. But studying the moral underpinnings of political 
sense-making has the potential to provide useful insights for devising strategies to counter this 
trend. Lakoff and Haidt corroborate a number of each other’s key findings relating to which moral 
facets are critical elements in the moral architecture of individuals from either side of the political 
spectrum.  
On the conservative side of the ideological spectrum, both authors concur that the role of family is 
fundamental to the conservative worldview, with Haidt evoking Emile Durkheim’s assertion that 
the hierarchically structured family is the basic conservative social unit, while Lakoff asserts that 
a hierarchical strict father model of the family is the overarching moral metaphor from which all 
supplementary conservative moral facets are derived. The conservative perception of family and 
the primacy with which it is held both consciously and unconsciously appears to exact a significant 
influence on the political sense-making of conservatives. The strict father morality that Lakoff 
proposes is disproportionately constituted by the metaphor of moral authority, asserted to be a 
cornerstone of conservative ideology and holding a high moral priority. This overlaps strongly with 
Haidt’s assertion that the authority moral foundation is a distinctive and critical element of 
conservative ideology. This reverence for authority interrelates with and legitimates the 
conservative conception of family as a hierarchical institution with the father figure as the authority 
figure.  The moral nature of discipline and sacrifice in the pursuit of material success claimed by 
Lakoff implies that the competitive nature of modern western societies with a strong belief in 
markets as the arbiters of fair distribution is not just moral, but ideal, as it is a mechanism by which 
moral, disciplined people can be discerned from lazy, undeserving, immoral individuals. This is 
also supported by Haidt’s reinterpretation of the conservative understanding of fairness to reflect 
the notion of proportionality, another way of describing the distribution resulting from the vision 
of a competitive meritocracy. This idealisation of competition is coherent both with a strict, 
hierarchical family context that instils the necessary discipline to survive and thrive in a competitive 
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world, and with notions of legitimate authority, with the state enforcing the rules of this competitive 
society and ensuring free-riders and cheaters are dealt with harshly. These core elements of 
conservative ideology: family, legitimate authority, and competition, are not only strongly coherent 
with each other and form the constituents of a cogent conservative vision of society, but they serve 
to reinforce the credence among conservatives of this vision. The coherence of this conservative 
vision of society underpinned by these moral components identified by Lakoff and Haidt may be 
part of the reason behind the current dominance of conservative politics in the USA and other 
western countries. 
Conversely, there are findings laid forth by Haidt and Lakoff that insinuate potential inconsistencies 
within the liberal political ideology that may be undermining electoral success for the Democrats 
in the USA and other left parties in western countries around the world. The prominence of Haidt’s 
liberty moral foundation in the moral matrix of liberals encapsulates the strong liberal emphasis on 
self-determination and individual freedoms, whereby the individual is the basic social unit. This is 
also captured by Lakoff’s liberal metaphors of moral self-development and self-interest. As Haidt 
has pointed out, the liberty foundation “…operates in tension with the authority foundation” (Haidt, 
2012, p. 201), but whereas conservatives have managed to coalesce a legitimate interpretation of 
authority alongside their (admittedly distinct) penchant for liberty, the notion of authority does not 
register within liberals’ moral architecture. Lakoff’s liberal moral metaphorical framework 
similarly has no recognition of authority contained within it either. This absence of a moral 
interpretation of authority has manifested in a distinguishable liberal aversion and suspicion 
towards authority that may only be increasing as the process of societal individualisation 
progresses. Underpinning many of the political goals of liberal political parties are communitarian 
ideals of a connection between the individual and the community. In order to provide assistance 
and care to those in need, protect the weak and vulnerable from predatory capitalism, and create a 
broad program of social infrastructure to foster a harmonious and prosperous society, a frontline of 
workers and volunteers is needed to materialise it. A vision of this kind of society then necessarily 
requires a strong level of cooperation amongst citizens in official employment capacity and in 
voluntary support roles. Regardless of whether, as this thesis has suggested, liberals are 
disproportionately being affected by the process of individualisation, the resultant increasingly 
prominent societal notions of self-sufficiency, self-determination, and self-actualisation are likely 
to erode the practical likelihood of materialising a communitarian vision of society. This 
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individualisation trend, the pre-existing prominence of the liberty foundation in liberal moral 
matrices and metaphorical notions of moral self-development and self-interest are acting to push 
liberally-minded individuals away from this goal, despite it still remaining an implicit element of 
the liberal political agenda.  
The liberal aversion towards authority creates yet another obstacle in creating this kind of society, 
as strong leadership and an effective judiciary system are crucial in correcting for the insidious 
elements of modern capitalist societies. Predatory elements in industries such as pharmaceuticals, 
health insurance, commercial and investment banking, mortgage broking, payday loans and others 
can only be reigned in by strong and moral political leadership, a judiciary that is non-partisan and 
ruling in the interests of the people, not those of corporate entities, and entities like federal law 
enforcement agencies that have historically maintained low levels of support from liberals 
(Thomson-DeVeaux, 2018). The Occupy movement that emerged in the USA in 2011 is a useful 
example of the practical manifestation of the left’s anti-authoritarianism, as the movement 
intentionally stayed leaderless throughout its period of prominence. However, without a clear set 
of demands or a focal point for achieving political influence, the movement subsided without any 
clear achievements outside of arguably shifting the terms of political debate. American political 
philosopher Jodi Dean articulated this issue after the movement had subsided: 
“Emphasis on autonomy encouraged people to pursue multiple, separate and even 
conflicting goals rather than work toward common ones. Celebration of horizontality 
heightened skepticism toward organizing structures like the General Assembly and the 
Spokes Council, ultimately leading to the dissolution of both and assertions of 
leaderlessness as a principle incited a kind of paranoia around leaders who emerged but 
could not be acknowledged or held accountable as leaders” (Dean, 2012). 
This is symptomatic of the relationship many on the left have with legitimate forms of authority 
and while conservatives simply mobilise to install authoritarian leaders to impose their 
ideological objectives, liberal apathy toward legitimate political authority can lead to the repeal 
of many critical liberal institutions. Donald Trump’s election to the presidency in 2016 is an 
example of this phenomenon, as voter turnout was the lowest in twenty years (Wallace, 2016) 
and he is currently in the process of dismantling much of the liberal legacy of President Obama 
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including attempts to repeal a greater level of health insurance coverage under the Affordable 
Care Act. 
These facets of liberal morality that are highlighted by Haidt and Lakoff, namely an 
individualistic leaning and an aversion toward authority, while significant elements of liberal 
political sense-making, are argued here to be counter-productive towards manifesting the 
cooperative, communitarian vision of society that is similarly prominent within the liberal 
political ideology. They act as barriers that must be overcome to achieve this vision, rather than 
as forces tendentially propelling society in this direction and contrast with the seamless 
conservative interrelationship of the notional hierarchical family with legitimate forms of 
authority and a competitive society with proportionally distributed material wealth.  This 
coherence of key elements of conservative morality and consequent political sense-making 
contributes to the propagation of conservative ideology and is potentially one key reason 
behind the dominance of the conservative side of politics in the USA in recent decades and 
possibly the current widespread electoral success of right-wing parties across the western 
world. In contrast, the waning fortunes of many left-wing parties in recent years may be linked 
to the current and potentially increasing degree of divergence between the fundamental 
underlying communitarian ideals of such parties and the counterproductive anti-authoritarian 
and individualistic tendencies that partly constitute the liberal moral architecture. In order to 
effectively counter this recent current of conservative ascendancy, strategies must be devised 
that acknowledge these antithetical elements and seek to ameliorate them. Figure 6 below 
depicts the coherence of the aforementioned elements of the conservative moral architecture 
and the discordance of the liberal equivalents. 
  
Figure 6. The coherence and discordance of key facets of conservative and liberal morality (Novy/Wilson, own elaboration) 
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6. Discussion 
 
A key finding of this thesis is the relative primacy of morality and emotion in political sense-
making compared to the role that reason plays in this same process. Reason is found to be mostly 
a post-hoc process that is acting in response to emotional triggers that have their genesis in the 
moral architecture of individuals. The conventional focus of liberal politicians and parties to target 
individuals with strategies primarily promoting policy issues and factual information is therefore 
doomed to be less effective than those that utilise a moralistic and emotional framework to generate 
communications. The implications of this finding are not limited to a US context, despite the three 
authors critical to this thesis being of US origin, as the mechanisms involved are of a subconscious 
psychological nature with roots in the neurology of the brain. This is therefore something that 
liberal political parties around the world should take note of and consider when developing their 
political communication strategies and materials. Focusing on emotive and moralistic strategies 
does not exclude the potential for incorporating relevant policy and factual content, but rather it 
should not form the primary thrust of any political communications at the expense of triggering 
emotional responses derived from engaging the subconscious moral architecture of individuals that 
is so critical in influencing their political sense-making process.  
The domains of moral convergence between Lakoff and Haidt’s analyses identified in this thesis 
provide a strong theoretical underpinning to a practical blueprint for liberal political campaigns in 
the USA. A focus on producing messaging that engages with notions of care, empathy, fairness, 
and liberty that are shown by Lakoff and Haidt to be core elements of the subconscious moral 
architecture of liberals is critical to evoking the kind of emotional responses in individuals that 
makes their political actuation more likely. This is particularly important in countries where voting 
is voluntary like the USA, as there is a threshold of apathy or passivity that must be overcome to 
effectuate political success. The proportionality related interpretation of fairness outlined by Haidt 
is just as prominent in the moral matrix of conservatives as that of liberals and therefore 
communications that have it embedded within them are more likely to evoke a positive response 
from conservatives as well as the primary target of liberals. Lakoff’s broader interpretation of 
fairness that includes notions of equality overlaps with Haidt’s equality related liberty foundation 
and this suggests that both interpretations of fairness should be utilised for maximum impact. Both 
authors assert that there is a moral hierarchy of sorts, with care/nurturance/empathy being the most 
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prominently represented element within the liberal moral architecture, followed by liberty 
according to Haidt, or rather fairness according to Lakoff. Fairness is ranked third by Haidt, 
showing that it is prominent in both analyses. This implies that liberal political discourse, at least 
in the USA, should focus heavily on both issues and emotive communications relating to 
care/nurturance/empathy as constitutes a disproportionately significant component of the liberal 
moral architecture. 
The language used in political communications is fundamentally important in translating Haidt, 
Lakoff and Westen’s findings into real-world influence. Both Lakoff and Westen emphasise the 
value of framing techniques for influencing individuals’ perspectives of specific policies and 
issues, as it is a key mechanism by which moral connections to these policies and issues can be 
engendered. By choosing wording and metaphorical descriptions that link a specific policy or issue 
to ideas or visualisations that embody one or more of the constituents of liberal morality, the 
perspective an individual has of that policy or issue can be changed over time. Lakoff argues that 
Republicans in the USA have been doing this for decades to great success, framing taxes as a 
burden to be relieved of (“tax relief”), rather than an investment in society, and giving Orwellian 
names to pieces of legislation like The Clean Skies Initiative that weakened previous legislation on 
air pollution, and the Healthy Forests Initiative that allowed logging in previously protected forests 
(Lakoff, 2014). The people that Lakoff asserts are most susceptible to a change in perspective from 
these types of framing techniques are what he dubs “biconceptuals”, individuals who are 
conservative on some issues and progressive on others. Another description of these people is the 
political “middle”, as there is no political ideology of the middle, but rather people who do not 
neatly fit into Haidt’s delineated conservative and liberal moral matrices, nor are governed entirely 
by Lakoff’s strict father or nurturant parent models of morality. For instance, libertarians, who 
according to Haidt’s analysis are essentially liberals without a care foundation, but an extremely 
prominent liberty foundation could be considered within this biconceptual or middle framework. 
Targeting these individuals by framing the current increasing levels of wealth inequality and 
stagnating social mobility in the USA as oppression by a rich elite and placing a heavy focus on 
equality of opportunity may be one way to do this. Similarly, framing other liberal issues like 
legalisation of marijuana and maintaining abortion rights as pushing the government out of people’s 
lives may prove effective in attracting libertarians to the liberal side of politics and away from the 
free-market conservatives with whom they are currently most commonly aligned. Finding ways to 
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frame core liberal issues in ways that engage with the moral foundations present in the moral 
matrices of conservatives, yet absent from those of liberals—namely authority, loyalty, and 
sanctity—while not putting off liberal voters, is key to translating these biconceptual individuals 
into votes at the ballot box.  
If it is conceded that the moral matrices of individuals in a society are not fixed over time, this 
raises important considerations for liberal political parties and their long-term strategic planning. 
The individualisation of western societies brings with it the impetus to not only understand how 
this is shaping politics in each country, but how it is remoulding people’s morals and values. This 
is a crucial area for future research, as the rate at which the process of individualisation is altering 
the moral architecture of liberals and the extent to which liberals are potentially disproportionately 
impacted by it are critically important for fostering the imperative to develop current strategies that 
deal with this problem. Future research may be able to discern whether this is indeed something 
that warrants significant attention, and precisely to what extent resources should be dedicated to 
allaying the problem in the present. If the analysis in this thesis proves to be correct—that 
individualisation is contributing to liberals becoming more libertarian over time—then a greater 
emphasis on communitarian ideals and developing strategies to counter this trend would be of a 
high priority. Likewise, if the analysis provided herein, that liberal individualistic and anti-
authoritarian tendencies are inherently counter-productive to achieving these communitarian 
ideals, then a longer-term perspective on altering the liberal moral matrix to be more conducive 
towards achieving them would be prudent. Again, further research on discerning the nature of this 
issue and the extent to which current-day liberal morality provides a barrier to achieving the long-
standing liberal goal of an increasingly communitarian society is to be encouraged. 
As has been previously discussed, the focus of liberal political parties and politicians on appealing 
to individuals’ ability to reason and interpret information rationally is misguided. Lakoff (2014) 
outlines how Republicans in the USA have recognised this for many years and developed 
sophisticated language and framing techniques in response. It is not only, however, their use of 
language and framing that is so advanced, but their understanding of the full suite of tactics 
available to influence individuals below the level of the conscious reasoning process. Westen 
provides many examples of Republican advertising campaigns that utilise effective visual and 
auditory cues to activate established neural networks and evoke emotional responses in viewers 
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that subsequently increase the likelihood of these viewers to vote, and vote for conservative 
candidates. The infamous Willie Horton ad produced by supporters of George H. W. Bush in 1988 
is one such example. The ad played on subconscious race-based prejudices against African 
Americans by telling the story of William Horton, a black man who committed rape while on a 
weekend pass from prison, to link the Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis with being weak on 
crime while governor of Massachusetts. The racial overtones were clear, but the style of the ad was 
designed specifically for maximum subconscious impact; the menacing William Horton mugshot 
was used prominently to evoke fear and particularly unflattering and goofy-looking pictures of 
Dukakis were juxtaposed against a tough, resolute looking Bush to reinforce the message of 
incompetence on the issue of crime. Despite the criminal never going by the name Willie (Farhi, 
2004), the ad used this more conventionally black name, as it further contributed to the activation 
of the desired mental associations. The ad was followed up immediately by an official Bush 
campaign ad promoting the notion that under Dukakis, there was a “revolving door” for criminals 
leaving prison on weekend furloughs, intended to reinforce the neural pathway that was established 
by the Willie Horton ad. This ad used similarly evocative imagery and sound effects to great effect, 
showing a long line of prisoners entering and immediately leaving prison through a revolving door 
while the words “268 escaped” appeared on the screen. The sound of increasingly loud, shuffling 
feet keeping time like a metronome and menacing, monotonous music accompanies the imagery of 
prisoners leaving prison to the outside world. Donald Trump has utilised an ad in a similar vein to 
“Willie Horton” in the 2018 midterm elections showing a convicted murderer who was deported 
twice, but made his way back into the USA, laughing in court while admitting to killing US police 
officers and wishing he had killed more. This is juxtaposed against footage of a large crowd of 
migrants breaking down a fence to gain access to the other side. The words “Democrats let him 
into our country”, “Democrats let him stay”, and “who else would Democrats let in?” are shown 
on the screen while menacing music with beating drums plays in the background.  
While these ads are clearly unethical, the techniques they use are effective, because they are 
triggering subconscious neural networks and primal emotions like fear and loathing towards 
outsiders. Finding ways to trigger negative emotional responses towards opposition candidates and 
positive emotional responses in an ethical way towards their own candidate should be a priority of 
liberal political parties everywhere. As Haidt has identified the care foundation as the strongest 
represented moral foundation within the liberal moral matrix and Lakoff has similarly asserted that 
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empathy and nurturance are the top moral priorities of liberals, it would appear this is a logical 
domain to attempt emotionally evocative communication strategies. However, the notion of 
oppression has the potential to strongly engage with both the liberty and fairness foundations and 
has the added bonus of potentially instigating libertarians to side with liberals, given their liberty 
foundation is extremely pronounced. Historical resistance of liberals to techniques like those used 
in the Willie Horton and revolving door advertisements may stem from the fact that many examples 
are similarly stoking insidious racial prejudices and are blatantly unethical. However, there is 
nothing inherently unethical in attempting to activate neural networks associated with strong 
emotional responses. Liberal political parties must seek to understand better how to activate neural 
networks connected to core elements of liberal morality that simultaneously have the potential to 
elicit a strong emotional response.  
In a similar vein, recognition of the potency a candidate that can elicit positive emotional 
inclinations can have is potentially underestimated. Westen (2008) provides research showing that 
a candidate’s body language—mannerisms, facial expressions, eye contact etc.—can have a 
significant subconscious impact on perceptions of a candidate and consequently their electoral 
success. If there is a choice between a candidate that has a superior breadth of knowledge on the 
issues that is unlikeable or a similarly—albeit less—knowledgeable candidate who is highly 
charismatic and exudes authenticity while exhibiting favourable body language and demeanour, 
the latter candidate may be more conducive to electoral success. Conventional pathways to 
candidacy or leadership, especially in countries that do not have open primaries can elevate 
individuals who are factional stalwarts or policy wonks, who have managed to nimbly navigate the 
political arena, but who may not resonate with voters. While the ability to connect with individuals’ 
underlying moral architecture is critical, the delivery also matters; if opposing candidates are both 
successfully engaging with a voter’s morals and values, but one projects potent body language and 
demeanour while the other does not, this would likely reflect an electoral advantage. This should 
not be underestimated in internal party considerations relating to candidate selection.  
The assertion made in this thesis regarding the primacy of morality and emotion, relative to reason, 
in political sense-making, is uncontroversial. It is supported by a large body of empirical evidence 
showcased in this thesis, as well as well-developed theoretical analyses from authors like Haidt and 
Lakoff. Further research and contemplation on this issue may be warranted but should not be a 
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priority. Alternatively, the further delineation of moral matrices across the political spectrum and 
how these interact with emotional centres of the brain is a crucial and urgent area for future 
research. The intangible nature of these phenomena demand as much corroboration as possible, 
and the broader range of methodological attempts utilised to do-so the better, as it has the combined 
benefit of potentially illuminating previously unearthed facets of them, while also increasing the 
confidence of their concrete existence when there are overlapping findings. Further exploration of 
the partisan divide of influence from the individualisation of society is also imperative, as a 
lopsided detriment to the liberal moral architecture and its consequent political manifestation may 
entail dire future consequences. A decision to take a long-term approach to altering the moral 
architecture of liberals in order to be more politically competitive should be based on a strong 
theoretical and empirical foundation. As such, this is suggested to be yet another priority area for 
future research.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
 The current political climate in the USA and other western democracies is tense, and subject to 
divisive rhetoric attempting to engender fear of outsiders, of the differences between those within 
a society and of a rapidly changing world. The fomenting of these fears is made possible by 
formulating rhetoric that effectively engages with subconscious mental mechanisms that are 
triggered by particular language and other auditory and visual cues. The authors that constitute the 
core focus of this thesis all conclude that the conservative side of politics (at least in the USA) have 
been much more successful in understanding how to craft such language and sensory cues than 
those on the left and that this has created a lopsided playing field whereby the left is failing to 
energise individuals and actuate them to vote to the same degree. Without a remedy to this 
paradigm, the dominant politics of fear and division will potentially lead to conflict and a tearing 
of the social fabric. There is much at stake, and the left must find ways to become effective in the 
face of this current penchant for right-wing populism found across western democracies. Talk of 
the need for a “unifying vision” or a “kinder, gentler brand of politics” is noble in its intent but 
misguided in its prognosis; these conceptions are not necessarily counterproductive but fail to 
recognise the critical importance of communications orchestrated with an understanding of whether 
they will engage with people’s underlying moral architecture and evoke emotional responses 
accordingly. Incorporating an understanding of the role that morality and emotion plays in political 
sense-making is not mutually exclusive with such virtuous proclamations, but priority should be 
given to the former. 
The primacy of morality and emotion in the political sense-making process is a core finding of this 
thesis and is supported by the work of the three authors covered. The potential that an understanding 
of the delineation of moral architecture found across the political spectrum has for influencing 
political outcomes is profound, as political communications that embody the most critical or 
prominent elements of morality represented in an individual’s moral matrix are much likelier to 
evoke a strong emotional response regardless of the actual details of the particular policy or issue 
being presented. This is how Republicans in the USA have managed to maintain their electoral 
success, despite promoting policies that are often solely in the interest of a small, wealthy elite. 
While this is a disheartening fact, the potential upside for political parties on the left is enormous, 
as in contrast to conservatives, the primary focus of liberal policies is the benefit and prosperity of 
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all of society. Messaging that reflects this while effectively embodying critical elements of liberal 
morality like care, empathy, nurturance, fairness, and liberty is likely to evoke strong emotional 
responses from liberals and consequently an increased likelihood of their actuation to vote, and 
vote for liberal political parties. This is especially relevant in the USA and other non-compulsory 
voting countries where voter turnout tends to be low. Targeting “biconceptuals” with messaging 
that still conveys conventional liberal policies but in a way that engages conservative elements of 
morality such as authority, loyalty, and sanctity is one way to win over individuals that are 
considered to constitute the political “middle”, or in other words, that do not typify either side of 
politics, but rather possess views and positions from both. Libertarian individuals with highly 
pronounced liberty foundations are also identified as potential targets for morally loaded 
communications that demonstrate how traditionally liberal positions promote the liberation of 
individuals from different forms of oppression. Potential examples include framing abortion rights 
and the legalisation of marijuana as keeping oppressive government intervention out of the lives of 
individuals and framing wealth inequality and stagnating social mobility as oppression by a rich 
elite over those less fortunate in society.  
As the moral architecture of individuals across the political spectrum is likely not to be static over 
the long term, political parties should consider which areas of morality that are currently under-
represented or absent from liberal moral matrices may be useful to foster over time. The suggestion 
of this thesis is that fostering an acceptance of legitimate forms of authority and highlighting the 
insidious tendency of individualism to make it harder to achieve communitarian goals may provide 
such long-term benefits. The process of individualisation of modern western societies is proposed 
to be disproportionately affecting the liberal side of politics, as the liberal tendency to exhibit 
neophilia, combined with a strong focus on individual rights and self-development and self-
actualisation makes the quest for carving out one’s unique identity—so central to today’s reflexive 
modernity—an utmost priority, whether it be through choice of career, travel experiences, fashion, 
lifestyle etc. This individualistic undercurrent imposes the cost of fewer people investing fewer 
resources in altruistic and communitarian goals, long a central plank of liberal ideology. Further 
research into confirming the existence of this discrepancy in the ideological susceptibility to 
individualisation is encouraged, as is research into its primary root causes if it indeed exists. 
As the degree of division and tribalism increases across many western democracies in this current 
age, it is imperative to find ways to bridge this divide for the sake of maintaining social cohesion 
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and avoiding conflict. Part of the solution is to create avenues for discussion, where people from 
across the political spectrum are invited to express their ideas and the moral reasoning behind them 
to others from differing ideological vantage points. This exposure to ideas that differ from one’s 
own in a constructive setting is healthy for democracy and should be encouraged wherever possible. 
New forums for these kinds of conversations are emerging such as podcasts, YouTube channels 
and festivals of ideas like The New Yorker Festival and Politicon. However, the mere existence of 
these new forums will not be sufficient to safeguard our societies from the kinds of tribalistic 
tendencies on display in recent years. What is critically needed in addition to this is a concerted 
effort from those in society to understand the morality of those that do not share our worldview. 
Recognition that there is indeed more than one matrix and that having a different set of morals to 
one’s own does not make those morals invalid is key to mollifying the vitriolic disdain between 
opposing sides of the political spectrum that has typified political discourse in recent years, 
particularly in the USA. This thesis seeks to contribute to that goal by highlighting the works of 
Lakoff and Haidt that seek to delineate the differing moral architecture of liberals and conservatives 
and explain where they originate. A widespread understanding of not only the legitimate 
differences in others’ moral matrix, but also of their potential to provide a useful societal 
counterweight to one’s own set of morals, has the potential to contribute to the abatement of 
hostility that plagues our current political landscapes.  
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